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The Federal Government Has an 
Implied Moral Constitutional Duty to 
Protect Individuals from Harm Due to 
Climate Change: Throwing Spaghetti 
against the Wall to See What Sticks 
Hope M. Babcock* 
The continuing failure of the federal government to respond to the growing 
threat of climate change, despite affirmative duties to do so, creates a 
governance vacuum that the Constitution might help fill, if such a responsibility 
could be found within the document. This Article explores textual and non-textual 
constitutional support for that responsibility, finding that no single provision of 
the Constitution is a perfect fit for that responsibility. However, the document as 
a whole might support constitutionalizing an environmental protection norm as 
an individual right or affirmative government obligation given the norm’s 
importance to the enjoyment of other constitutional rights and growing public 
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Because of the grave risk of serious harms to future generations, our failure 
to take timely mitigating actions on climate issues can be seen as a serious 
moral failing, especially in the light of our current knowledge and 
understanding of the problem.          
—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy1 
 
The federal government has an implied constitutional moral responsibility 
towards its citizens to do no harm. These responsibilities arise under the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Bill of Rights, the 
Ninth Amendment, and some argue from the Preamble2 to the Constitution.3 
 
 1.  Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo, Environmental Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2016 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/. 
 2.  “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 3.  The thinking, which is not developed in this Article, is that embedded in the words “general 
welfare” and “our posterity” is a direction that “the environment cannot be exploited beyond its sustainable 
use.” Caleb Hall, A Right Most Dear: The Case for a Constitutional Environmental Right, 30 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 85, 101 (2016). But see J. B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed 
Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 264–65 n.64 
(1999). Ruhl somewhat disparagingly comments that such an interpretation of the Preamble “would 
support a ‘right’ to a good job, a decent home, a good education, and a whole package of other social 
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Climate change is an anthropogenic-caused physical phenomenon, which 
threatens serious harm to the health and well-being of current and future U.S. 
citizens and to the natural environment on which they depend. The federal 
government has authority under various laws and common law doctrines to 
lessen, mitigate, and in some circumstances, avoid those impacts. The 
government’s continuing failure to act under those authorities conflicts with its 
implied moral constitutional duties. It is the seriousness of the threat from climate 
change and the failure of the government to respond adequately to it that 
encourage the search for an affirmative duty to protect human health and the 
environment in the Constitution.4 
This Article begins by briefly describing the impacts of climate change to 
demonstrate that the threat it poses to continued human existence is sufficiently 
substantial to warrant a constitutional reaction given the failure of the federal 
government to address it adequately. This discourse is followed by an analysis 
in Part II on the development of a theoretical framework supporting a 
constitutional basis for the federal government’s moral obligation to protect 
citizens from harm. Part III then considers both the importance of finding such a 
duty in the Constitution and how states and other nations have incorporated an 
environmental protection norm into their constitutions. Part IV discusses what 
such a norm might look like, tilting toward a norm that imposes a protective duty 
on the federal government rather than one that creates an individual right. Part V 
then explores where such a norm might be located in constitutional text. 
The Article concludes that it is difficult to find a single uncontested textual 
place in the Constitution from which one might draw an inference that the federal 
government has a moral duty to protect citizens from climate-induced harm. 
However, when the Constitution is viewed holistically, there may be sufficient 
support for a court to hold the government legally responsible for breaching that 
duty through acts of commission and omission. 
 
welfare policies not generally understood as having the status of pre-existing constitutional rights,” noting 
that efforts to find a right to a clean environment in the existing Constitution have all failed. Id. 
 4.  Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment in Us 
and in Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565, 567 (1998). See also id. at 582 (“The call for constitutional 
recognition of a right to a healthy environment in us and our posterity is premised on the seriousness of 
our situation and the reluctance we are showing to take effective action.”); id. at 646 (“It may be, then, 
that the right to a healthy environment will not achieve constitutional status until the Court becomes 
convinced both that the environmental dangers are real and that the political branches are failing to act 
responsibly, despite their pro-environmental rhetoric.”). Ledewitz believed that if environmental crises, 
like global climate change, were “to worsen substantially,” and the public were to “demand radical action 
from the government,” the idea of “a constitutional right to a healthy environment” might “no longer seem 
far-fetched.” Id. at 569. 
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I.  THE THREAT AND LOOMING REALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be 
what it is, because everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what 
it is, it wouldn’t be. And what it wouldn’t be, it would. You see? 
—Alice, Alice in Wonderland5  
 
Although the quality of the environment has improved overall since the 
passage of a surfeit of environmental laws in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, there are remaining, unaddressed problems, one of which is climate 
change.6 The belief that climate change is happening is almost universal.7 
Indeed, the consensus that the world’s climate is changing has reached a “a 
critical mass,”8 together with widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s 
inadequate response to it. The fact that a critical mass of the population perceives 
this as an unaddressed, socially important problem is the reason to turn to the 
Constitution for a solution. But before doing that, a convincing case must be 
made that the perception that climate change is a serious problem that the 
government is failing to address is correct, which this Part endeavors to do. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 report 
concluded that “human activity is ‘very likely’ causing the world to warm.”9 
“Every day about 6.9 billion of us, in ways small and large, collectively discharge 
prodigious amounts of carbon and other greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere.”10 These discharges cause changes in the atmosphere beyond its 
“natural variability,” making it likely that there will be “catastrophic climate 
disruption caused by greenhouse heating.”11 “The average surface temperature 
 
 5.  ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1951). 
 6.  Hall, supra note 3, at 92 (“[A]lthough environmental quality has improved overall, 
environmental statutes fail to address the disproportionate environmental burden the poor and people of 
color still bear. Worse, climate change continues to be an unsolved problem both domestically and 
internationally.”). Rodger Schlickeisen adds to this list of unaddressed problems “ozone depletion, 
industrial chemicals that enter the food chain and disrupt hormones in humans and other animals,” and 
irreversible biodiversity loss, the speed of which is accelerating. Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting 
Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
181, 184 (1994). 
 7.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 569 (citing Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change 
Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 74 n.1 (1998)). 
 8.  Id. (citing Michaelson, supra note 7, at 74 n.1). 
 9.  See, e.g., IPCC INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (2007). See also id. at 39 (“Most of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
[greenhouse gas] concentrations.”). 
 10.  James L. Olmsted, The Butterfly Effect: Conservation Easements, Climate Change, and 
Invasive Species, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 41, 42 (2011). 
 11.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 1992, 
S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) (“‘Climate 
change’ means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods.”); STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1 (referencing Paul 
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of the earth increased 0.76° C (1.4° F) in the twentieth century and the prediction 
is that it will increase by another 1.8 to 4.0° C (3.2 to 7.2° F) in the twenty-first 
century, depending on pollution levels.”12 Temperatures in the United States 
may increase between 4 and 11⁰ F by the end of the century.13 
The harmful impacts of climate change are well known—“longer hot 
seasons, which result in droughts, shorter and warmer winters,” sea level rise (by 
as much as two meters by 2100), and “more frequent extreme weather patterns 
such as hailstorms and heavier rains.”14 These impacts lead to increased 
flooding, wildfires, mudslides, and disease outbreaks.15 “At best, the symptoms 
of climate change alter the ability of individuals and governments to use their 
lands in ways they have in years past. At worst, they force entire communities to 
relocate and endanger human lives.”16 
Climate change is also a serious problem because it subjects biodiversity 
“to new risks and uncertainties.”17 The high rate of species loss due to climate 
change in the last century is expected to accelerate “in the near future by a factor 
of ten or more.”18 Changes in global temperatures and rainfall, together with 
ocean acidification and sea level rise, will push many species towards extinction 
by destroying or diminishing vital habitat, limiting the quality and quantity of 
prey, and increasing predation, competition, and disease.19 The overall loss of 
biodiversity will contribute to “exponential increases in extinction rates”20 and 
may “impair the ability of natural ecosystems to regulate atmospheric gases, 
purify water, decompose wastes, generate fertile soils, provide food directly, 
cycle vital nutrients[,] and control insects and wildlife diseases that destroy crops 
and otherwise impact human health.”21 Climate change will challenge “the 
resilience and adaptive capacity of natural systems.”22 While there may be a 
 
Ehrlich & Anne Ehrlich, The Population Bomb Revisited, 1 ELECTRONIC J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV., 2009, 
at 5, 8). 
 12.  Pamela S. Chasek, Rethinking the Law and Policy of Protected Areas in a Warming World: 
Evolving Approaches of American Conservation Organizations, 15 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POLICY 41, 49 
(2012). 
 13.  Nicholas Whipps, What Happens When Species Move But Resources Do Not? Creating Climate 
Adaptive Solutions to Climate Change, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 559 (2015). 
 14.  Jamie Kay Ford & Erick Giles, Climate Change Adaptation in Indian Country: Tribal 
Regulation of Reservation Lands and Natural Resources, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 519, 524 (2015). 
The net result of all of this is what we call “global climate change.” See Olmsted, supra note 10, at 43. 
 15.  Ford & Giles, supra note 14, at 524. 
 16.  Id. at 520. 
 17.  Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting Animal 
Migrations as Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 238 (2010). 
 18.  Tristan Kimbrell, Note, Moving Species and Non-Moving Reserves: Conservation Banking and 
the Impact of Climate Change, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 120–21 (2010). 
 19.  Jaclyn Lopez, Biodiversity on the Brink: The Role of Assisted Migration in Managing 
Endangered Species Threatened with Rising Seas, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 161–62 (2015). 
 20.  Olmsted, supra note 10, at 56–57. 
 21.  Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 187. 
 22.  Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How Program Goals 
and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 721 (2016). 
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future way to “micromanage the natural ecosystems and the millions of species 
they contain” to avoid some of these impacts through something like 
geoengineering, Edward O. Wilson, a world renowned biologist, worries that “it 
will be too late for the ecosystems—and perhaps for us.”23 The loss of species 
and genetic diversity “will reduce the promise of developing new medicines to 
fight disease, of using unique biological processes as medical models to discover 
new health benefits, and of preserving a sufficient variety of food sources to feed 
an exploding human population.”24 Additionally, the disappearance “of 
distinctive animals and plants will deprive humanity of significant aesthetic, 
recreational, and emotional benefits.”25 Economists have assessed the global 
economic impact of climate change to be around $5.6 trillion.26 
The federal government has done little to respond to the threats and 
increasing evidence of climate change. The most recent administration has 
stopped, slowed, or reversed initiatives taken by the prior administration to lessen 
the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and encourage adaption to the 
effects of climate change.27 It has expunged climate change information from 
agency websites, and defunded or marginalized programs designed to study, 
mitigate, or adapt to climate change.28 The most recent Congress, as well, has 
defunded administrative climate change initiatives and proposed legislation to 
block the federal government from regulating greenhouse gas sources.29 The 
courts too have largely barred the courthouse door to climate change lawsuits.30 
 
 23.  Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 189. See also STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 
1 (reporting that Stephen Gardiner’s pessimism about progress on climate change included a negative 
view about technological changes like “geoengineering as the antidote to climate problems, echoing the 
concerns of others that further domination of and large-scale interventions in nature may turn out to be a 
greater evil than enduring a climate catastrophe”). 
 24.  Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 186. 
 25.  Id. In addition, the “ethical dilemma of being part of one species that is causing the extinction 
of many others may produce significant mental anguish.” Id. at 186–87. 
 26.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 577 (citing WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL 
COMMONS 82–83 (1994)). 
 27.  See Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/ (listing multiple pages of such 
initiatives ranging from proposing revisions to the methane and waste prevention rule, expanding offshore 
oil and gas drilling, withdrawing a proposed rule for flood plain management and resilience, proposing 
rescission of the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, and the U.S. Department of the Interior 
ordering rescission of all climate and mitigation policies, to name just a few of the more recent ones). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. (listing multiple pages of such initiatives, such as a bill passed by the House to reduce 
economically burdensome regulations, a House bill to terminate EPA, a Senate resolution to overturn the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, House and Senate bills to delay implementation of the 2015 Ozone 
Standards, and a House bill to prevent federal agencies from regulating greenhouse gases under existing 
laws). 
 30.  See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (holding that the Clean Air 
Act displaced a federal common law claim seeking injunctive relief for greenhouse gas emissions); Native 
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding federal common 
law displaced when plaintiffs sought climate change-induced damages); but see United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 884 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2018) (declining to order the District Court for the District of Oregon 
to dismiss a climate change lawsuit). 
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Finding physical and institutional solutions to climate change is difficult. 
But, that task is made more difficult by the moral issues wrapped up in the 
problem, which play a fundamental role in any discussion of climate policy.31 
One ethics scholar, Stephen Gardiner, has identified two moral issues: the “non-
identity problem”32 and the fact that future generations are more likely to suffer 
the impacts of climate change than present generations, giving the current 
generation little incentive to address the phenomenon.33 The “tangle of issues” 
involved in trying to resolve climate change, according to Gardiner, “conspires 
to encourage buck-passing, weakness of will, distraction and procrastination, 
‘mak[ing] us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption.’”34 Yet, the failure to 
solve the problems created by climate change now could cause “the diminution 
not only of nature and natural systems, but also of human dignity itself.”35 
The next Part of the Article explores the moral dimensions of the 
government’s failure to fulfill its legal obligation to protect people from the 
effects of climate change. In theory, once a society or community comprehends 
the need for a law and “has embraced the values the law represents,” then it “will 
observe the laws and support their enforcement against those who neglect or 
reject the laws.”36 Yet, in practice, society has failed, justifying the need for a 
constitutional protection. Part II addresses whether a climate change legal duty 
is best expressed as an individual right to be free from the harmful effects of 
climate change or an affirmative obligation on the government to protect 
individuals from climate-induced harm, in addition to whether this distinction is 
meaningful. 
II.  A MORAL DUTY TO PROTECT PEOPLE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 
We unnecessarily cabin our dialogue, therefore, by focusing too much on 
whether a right is positive or negative. Law generally imports obligations, 
however specific or vague, about what citizens or the government must do or 
refrain from doing; and it defines relationships between citizens and their 
government, citizens and other citizens, and citizens and the natural and 
anthropogenic world. We generally consider these relationships separate 
from ethics, morality, or religious tenets. Yet each of these obligations serve 
beside law as organizing norms for communities. Our Declaration of 
Independence, after all, furnishes aspirational principles. Today, NEPA’s 
grandiose language about a healthy environment is considered aspirational. 
 
 31.  STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Nicholas A. Robinson, Enforcing Environmental Norms: Diplomatic and Judicial Approaches, 
26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 387, 396 n.30 (2003). 
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—Sam Kalen37 
 
Before an argument can be made that the environmental protection norm 
has a constitutional dimension, it is important to understand the scope of the duty 
and whether the government has a moral duty to protect individuals from harm 
and what, if any, the consequences are of describing that duty as responding to 
an individual right or a freestanding, affirmative government obligation.38 As 
this Part shows, some scholars describe this as an individual right, others as a 
government duty. How the term is defined may determine in what way and 
whether it can fit into the Constitution and whether it is enforceable.39 Regardless 
of which side of this debate the scholar is on, they all appear to agree that the 
duty extends forward to include generations yet born and all have a general idea 
of its scope. 
Professor Martha Nussbaum is among the scholars who suggest that one 
should “see the question of duties as that of shouldering a burden looking to the 
future. And that means that it is simply natural, as a next step, to look around the 
world at the capacities of different structures—nations, corporations, individuals, 
NGOs—and to favor an allocation of duties that seems most likely” to halt and 
reverse the impacts of climate change.40 Professor Rodger Schlickeisen agrees 
that the duty should be “intergenerational,” commenting that “the living are at 
once trustees of the environment for future generations and beneficiaries of that 
environment (which previous generations held in trust for them).”41 Nussbaum 
also notes, as to the scope of the duty, that before one can decide on what the 
goals of any duty should be and how to act on them, certain preliminary questions 
 
 37.  Sam Kalen, An Essay: An Aspirational Right to a Healthy Environment, 34 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 156, 188 (2016). 
 38.  See Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 612 (“Among supporters of the general idea of such an 
amendment, there is opposition to an amendment based on a concept of rights. This has led to proposals 
for a constitutional amendment based not on individual rights, but on responsibilities or obligations of 
government.”). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Climate Change: Why Theories of Justice Matter, 13 CHI. 
J. INT’L L, 469, 474 (2013) (“ethical thought in the international sphere ought to begin with an account of 
our duties, rather than an account of people’s entitlements. . . . [W]e [should] think about what we have a 
duty to do and not to do to, and for, human beings.”). 
 39.  Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 
GEO. L.J. 5, 7 (2011), There are  
two types of uncertainty that are associated with legal liability. The first type, legal uncertainty, 
relates to uncertainty regarding the content of an obligation. In many cases, legal obligations 
are vague, and therefore, parties may not be sure, ex ante, whether liability will be attached to 
a certain type of behavior. The second type, enforcement uncertainty, relates to uncertainty 
regarding implementation of the legal norm. Violations of legal norms often do not entail any 
consequences due to problems such as lack of detection. 
Id. 
 40.  Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 478. See also id. (“My own view suggests that we therefore begin 
with a specification of a threshold of entitlement that seems commensurate with the respect we have for 
human dignity, and that seems inherent in the idea of a life worthy of people’s human dignity.”); STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1. 
 41.  Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 193. 
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need to be answered.42 She wonders whether the focus of any such duty should 
only be on human capabilities or whether intrinsic—as opposed to instrumental 
value—should be attached to the capabilities of non-human animals (or even 
plants).43 
A rights-based approach can compel the government to act responsibly 
towards both present and future generations.44 Giving a new right to an 
unprotected future generation improves the protection of that group, even if there 
are protective statutes or regulations because “in the legal hierarchy, rights are at 
a higher level.”45 Hence any environmental protection norm should be described 
as a right. Professor Edith Brown Weiss agrees: “Intergenerational rights have 
greater moral force than do obligations.”46 To her, “the rights of present 
generations have limits,” and she cautions against overstepping them, stating, 
“[w]e have a right to use and enjoy the system, but no right to destroy its 
robustness and integrity for those who come after us.”47 
Professor Joseph L. Sax views the obligation to protect the rights of future 
generations as “not simply leaving the earth as it is . . . but refraining from those 
acts that impoverish by leaving less opportunity for freedom of action and 
thought by those who follow us,” even though there is “no ordinary legal precept 
that speaks of a duty not to impoverish the world, nor is there formal recognition 
of social capital or patrimonial property.”48 He translates this commitment into 
 
 42.  Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 485. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  An Environmental Right for Future Generations: Model State Constitutional Provisions & 
Model Statute, SCIENCE & ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NETWORK & THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 5 (Nov. 2008) https://sehn.org/pdf/Model_Provisions 
_Mod1E7275.pdf [hereinafter Model Provisions and Statute] (“[A]n environmentally focused, rights-
based framework obligates governments to act in a way that takes into account the needs of future as well 
as present generations.”). See also id. at 4 (“The current regulatory system . . . fails, however adequately 
to take into account future generations or the long-term damage that environmental degradation can 
cause.”). 
 45.  Id. at 5 (“The granting of a new right to future generations strengthens the protection of the 
group. The United States places heightened importance on legal principles, such as the freedoms of speech 
and religion, once they have been enshrined as rights. In the legal hierarchy, rights are elevated above 
statutes and regulations.”). 
 46.  Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 204 (1990). 
 47.  Id. at 207. Weiss explains further that the  
purpose of human society must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every 
generation. This requires sustaining the life support systems of the planet, the ecological 
processes, environmental conditions, and cultural resources important for the survival and 
well-being of the human species, and a healthy and decent human environment. 
Id. at 200. Toward that end, Weiss views “the human community as a partnership among all generations,” 
which requires that, “each generation pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received it and 
provide equitable access to its resources and benefits.” Id. at 199, 200. 
 48.  Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 103 
(1990). 
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“a commitment” to maintain the “genetic stock . . . essentially undiminished.”49 
In other words, “[t]he stock of resources that constitutes our primary natural 
endowment should be conserved. The application here is a policy of sustaining 
yield in the management of resources, whether privately or publicly held, with 
the goal of undiminished productive capacity.”50 
Like Weiss, Sax questions “whether it is equitable to sacrifice options for 
future well-being in favour of supporting current lifestyles, especially the 
comfortable, and sometimes lavish, forms of life enjoyed in the rich countries.”51 
Sax supports the concept of sustainable development because it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
the concept of ‘needs,’ in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, 
to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations 
imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.52 
Given the intergenerational impact of climate change, an intergenerational 
focus could make the government’s obligation to arrest the harms of climate 
change more robust, regardless of whether the duty is described as an 
enforcement of a right or an affirmative obligation. Still, various professors have 
different views on how to characterize the environmental protection norm and 
where its source could be found. 
Professor Bruce Ledewitz defines the right as a right to a “healthy 
environment,”53 an environment “that has not been unalterably changed by 
man.”54 He proclaims that recognition of a constitutional right to a healthy 
environment is consistent with the Republican thinking’s “strong emphasis on 
 
 49.  Id. at 104–05. See also id. at 105 (“The practical application is to make habitat and species 
preservation a primary programmatic obligation of environmental law.”). 
 50.  Id. at 105. See also Eric T. Freyfogle, Should We Green the Bill?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 159, 
162 (1992) (identifying as a “central thread” connecting norms of “sustainable living” the “idea that each 
of our practices must be capable of repetition without harm to the land”). 
 51.  STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1. See also id. (“references to ‘the future’ 
need not be limited to the future of human beings only. In keeping with the non-anthropocentric focus of 
much environmental philosophy, a care for sustainability and biodiversity can embrace a care for 
opportunities available to non-human living things.”). 
 52.  Id. See also id. (“The notion of sustainable yield involves thinking of forests, rivers, oceans, 
and other ecosystems, including the natural species living in them, as a stock of ‘ecological capital’ from 
which all kinds of goods and services flow.”). 
 53.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 583. 
 54.  Id. at 583–585 (noting that these rights are to a planet that is “predominantly ‘natural’ rather 
than a manufactured event”). However, he does not extend this right to nature itself, but grounds it in 
human welfare. See id. at 585–86 (“The right to a healthy environment is one of clear human welfare—
not a right in nature itself.”) This distinguishes him from CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE 
STANDING: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1974) (asserts that nature itself does have 
some legal status). But see Brendon Swedlow, Reason for Hope — The Spotted Owl Injunctions and Policy 
Change, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 825, 853, 871–72 (2009) (“the environmental movement is just the 
latest iteration in efforts to expand the political community on an egalitarian basis, now to include 
nonhuman species like the spotted owl . . . In this view, environmentalism is a civil rights movement for 
nature.”). 
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social relations.”55 Ledewitz identifies two beneficiaries of a healthy 
environment: first, “any individual affected by permanent, human-caused 
changes in the environment would be entitled to protection”; second, “our 
posterity,” generations who have not yet been born.56 A rights-based approach 
“create[s] a general right to a healthy environment, rather than a system based on 
specific, pre-set levels of pollution,”57 as our current regulatory system provides. 
But, in his case, the right is framed in terms of an affirmative governmental 
obligation. 
Sax believes that the source of such a right can be found in a “public welfare 
responsibility,” where the state has agreed “to provide to each individual, as an 
entitlement, basic means essential to make it possible to flourish as a human 
being,” including food, shelter, and medical care, even if these basics are not yet 
individual rights.58 He finds “a claimed right of protection from environmental 
hazard . . . a small step from the proposition that each individual should be 
entitled to needed medical care . . . [and] to living and working conditions free 
from unwarranted health hazards.”59 He writes that “affirmative rights to a level 
of freedom from risk would be designed to create a basic norm of opportunity so 
that the least advantaged individual is insulated against imposition of risk below 
some minimal threshold within his or her own society.”60 This obviates the need 
to find, in the concept of an environmental right, a specific level of protection 
above which an assumption of the risk is not warranted, as there is “no 
objectively correct answer” to that question.61 Sax elicits “[t]hree basic 
precepts . . . from the central values of the modern world” that may be “adapted 
as the source of basic environmental rights: (1) fully informed[,] open decision 
making based upon free choice, (2) protection of all at a baseline reflecting 
respect for every member of the society, and (3) a commitment not to impoverish 
the earth and narrow the possibilities of the future.”62 
 
 55.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 634. 
 56.  Id. at 586–87. See also Kalen, supra note 37, at 194 ( “Leon G. Billings’s, who was instrumental 
in assisting Senator Muskie in crafting many of our modern environmental programs, observation how 
‘justice in the context of the environment requires gaining widespread global recognition that there is an 
inalienable right of all people to a clean, healthy[,] and safe environment.’”). 
 57.  Model Provisions and Statue, supra note 44, at 5 (“Article I of the Model Constitution 
establishes an inalienable right to an ‘ecologically healthy environment’ for present and future 
generations, and it defines this ‘fundamental’ and ‘self-executing’ right as including but not limited to ‘the 
enjoyment of clean air, pure water, and scenic lands[,] freedom from unwarranted exposure to toxic 
chemicals and other contaminants[,] and a secure climate.’”). Sax, supra note 48, at 96 (Sax identifies a 
“patrimonial responsibility as a public duty” as one of the bases for environmental rights). 
 58.  Sax, supra note 48, at 100. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 101. See also id. at 101–02 (“One important aspect of respect for distinctive communities 
is listening to their demands for insulation, at least in the absence of some compelling, conflicting need, 
from imposed pressures of modernization and development that foment destruction of their cultural life.”). 
 61.  Id. at 100. See also id. at 100–01 (“Just how much can individuals be required to submit to risk 
as a ‘conscript’ in the struggle to achieve the benefits of a modern society?”). 
 62.  Id. at 105. 
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Conflating rights and duties, Sax extrapolates from terms like 
“environmental quality” and “a decent environment” a “version of welfare-state 
ideology,” the goal of which “would not be government abstention, but rather a 
call for affirmative action by the state—a demand that it assure, as a right of each 
individual, some level of freedom from environmental hazards or some degree 
of access to environmental benefits.”63 Like Weiss, he worries about decisions 
that might “foreclose future opportunities” by squandering the world’s 
patrimony or social capital64 or place disproportionate environmental risks upon 
a “small segment of the population.”65 He argues that while the answer to these 
concerns is not absolute, he believes that “a fundamental right to a substantive 
entitlement which designates minimum norms” would help prevent enactment of 
these worrisome decisions.66 
Professor Ronald Klipsch also straddles the affirmative obligation rights 
argument and suggests that “[t]he question should be not whether there is a right 
to a habitable environment, but whether health, life, property, . . . species, or 
aesthetic interests . . . are protected from environment-altering activity.”67 
Klipsch believes that while “[t]he Constitution does not strike [a precise] 
ecosystem balance, . . . it does demand that a balance be struck, and that citizens 
be informed and involved in the striking.”68 
However, Sax identifies several problems with a pure rights-based 
approach. One is that “specific rights usually grow out of some core social 
value”;69 yet, “[t]here is no legal tradition in our system that recognizes rights to 
nature preservation, so we cannot turn to precedent for guidance,” nor is there 
any “historical experience on which to draw to give content to an asserted 
ecological right.”70 As Sax succinctly notes, “[t]here is no evident environmental 
principle analogous to the ‘hands off’ principle that underlies basic human 
rights.”71 Another problem he identifies is that while environmental claims 
 
 63.  Id. at 95. See also id. (“The closest analogy would seem to be found among the precepts of a 
modern welfare state. The effort to guarantee each individual a basic right to decent housing, health care, 
nutrition, safe working conditions, and cultural opportunity seems most closely fitted to the effort of 
articulating basic environmental rights.”); Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 207 (“Sax suggests that a ‘driving 
idea behind efforts to establish environmental rights is a version of welfare-state ideology. . . [t]he goal 
would not be government abstention, but rather a call for affirmative action by the state—a demand that 
it assure, as a right of each individual, some level of freedom from environmental hazards or some degree 
of access to environmental benefits.’”). 
 64.  Sax, supra note 48, at 99. See also id. at 105 (explaining that this means protecting biodiversity 
and conservation of natural resources that constitute the world’s primary natural endowment). 
 65.  Id. at 99. 
 66.  Id. at 100. 
 67.  Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an 
Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203, 210 (1974). 
 68.  Id. at 237. See also STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1 (“Though ‘states [also] 
have a responsibility towards their own citizens and other states.’”). 
 69.  Sax, supra note 48, at 94. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
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import “certain substantive values,” they are not concerned with the integrity of 
the “structure of democracy,” which is the concern reflected in much of the 
Constitution.72 
Regardless of the semantic differences between the two sides of the debate 
over whether halting environmental harm is a right or an affirmative obligation, 
both sides of the debate agree that the ultimate goal of a protective environmental 
norm is to create a sustainable environment for present and future generations. 
The rights approach, however, appears to create more questions and be less 
bounded than the idea of an affirmative obligation resting on the government to 
tend to the phenomenon of climate change. 
Less apparent from this debate is whether the optimal way to achieve that 
goal is through the Constitution,73 and if it is, how that might be done. The next 
Part of the Article discusses why it is important to constitutionalize protection of 
the environment and the downside of doing that, followed by a debate on how 
that might be done. The latter conversation may help decide whether the 
environmental protection norm should be defined as a citizen’s right or the 
government’s duty. 
III.  WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO GIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
We made a choice, over two centuries ago, to craft an operational blueprint 
for government that would adopt social policy sparingly and only when it 
was clear that the policy could and would be delivered. 
—J. B. Ruhl74 
 
Giving constitutional status to environmental protection would achieve 
many things that could lead to greater environmental protection. For example, 
since one purpose of a constitution is to remove “certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy,”75 constitutionalizing an environmental 
protection norm might help break the legislative and administrative deadlock 
over reforming and strengthening environmental protection and might help 
 
 72.  Id. at 95. 
 73.  See Kalen, supra note 37, at 175–76 (“with minimal difficulty, the Constitution and the 
common law could serve as powerful forces in establishing an evolving environmental right[,] aspirational 
or otherwise.”). See also Sax, supra note 48, at 100. Sax posited that while the question of “whether the 
majority can be said to owe to each individual a basic right not to be left to fall below some minimal level 
of substantive protection against hazard” may not be “free from doubt,” he believed that “a fundamental 
right to a substantive entitlement which designates minimum norms should be recognized.” Id. 
 74.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 281. See also id. at 245–46 n.2 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution 
We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 441 (1983) (“The 
Constitution serves both as a blueprint for government operations and as an authoritative statement of the 
nation’s most important and enduring values.”). 
 75.  Hall, supra note 3, at 107 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 
(1943)). 
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depoliticize the issue.76 Given the deep political fault lines in American politics 
today, it is unrealistic to rely fully on legislative action to protect the 
environment: “Protecting the environment is a long-term goal” with “few short-
term political gains for politicians who support environmentally friendly laws.”77 
Recognition of a constitutionalized norm of environmental protection could 
also be helpful in achieving “environmental justice for the disadvantaged and 
oppressed,” promoting “international constitutional law, particularly in third 
world and formerly Communist countries,” and buttressing “the effort to 
preserve biodiversity.”78 Granting constitutional status to environmental 
protection could highlight to Americans its importance.79 It might “reinvigorate 
environmental law, not merely in welfarist terms, but in terms of [the] ethical 
self-understanding of its authors,”80 and allow a widely accepted social policy to 
advance.81 Indeed, Professor Sam Kalen expresses hope that constitutionalizing 
an environmental protection norm might reawaken “the popular constitutional 
movement achieved within those laws.”82 
Finding a place in the Constitution for environmental protection might 
provide “an over-arching legal and normative framework for directing 
environmental policy,”83 give environmental protection some prominence 
among competing values, and bolster laws designed to protect the 
environment.84 It might also act as a brake on governmental action harmful to 
the environment.85 Professor Caleb Hall muses that while a constitutionalized 
 
 76.  Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric 
Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 623 (2008) (“guarantees some degree of 
environmental protection that is free from daily politics”). See also Hall, supra note 3, at 107 (“A 
constitutional right is a floor, not a stop gap measure to be applied if statutory involvement is 
insufficient.”). 
 77.  Bruckerhoff, supra note 76, at 623. See also J.Y.P., Jr., Note, Toward a Constitutionally 
Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458, 486 (1970) (“judicial recognition of a constitutional right 
could not begin to resolve our environmental dilemma, it would reorient governmental priorities”). 
 78.  Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth 
Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 152 (1997). See also id. at 126–27 (worrying 
about “environmental problems that still have not been adequately addressed in the United States, such as 
global warming and biodiversity. Supporting organizations worry about the environmental legacy we are 
leaving to future generations. They feel that these problems will never be addressed in the present-day 
political climate of the United States. Brodsky’s supporters feel that an environmental constitutional 
amendment ‘may be our only effective long-term recourse’ to compel Congress to act on new problems 
and to preserve our present-day environmental protection laws.”). 
 79.  Bruckerhoff, supra note 76, at 623. 
 80.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 189 n.126. 
 81.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 271 (“These are examples of institutional necessity, where an 
amendment, and only an amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move forward in 
society.”). 
 82.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 189. 
 83.  Bruckerhoff, supra note 76, at 624 (quoting TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 6 (2005).) 
 84.  Id. at 624. 
 85.  Hall, supra note 3, at 100 (“A right to some measure of environmental quality may not require 
governmental intervention, but it may prevent governmental behavior that severely debilitates the 
environment.”). 
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environmental norm may not prevent destruction of the country’s 
“environmental treasures, [] it would prevent governments from playing an 
active role in such atrocities.”86 And the constitutional concept of due process, 
if an environmental norm were read into it, might “prevent governments from 
wholly abandoning environmental protection.”87 Even an aspirational right to 
environmental protection could “tilt the balance in difficult cases when 
environmental issues are present” and help “shape legislative debate.”88 
Constitutionalizing environmental protection might “promote [an] 
expansive interpretation of standing, expand a court’s remedial power, or narrow 
the reach of federalism concerns.”89 At minimum, a constitutional environmental 
protection norm would require consideration of environmental concerns in 
deciding constitutional questions like those that arise under the Takings Clause, 
and in standing and federalism disputes.90 
If courts were to recognize a due process right to environmental protection, 
given Congress’s almost “unlimited powers to enforce due process rights arising 
under section [one] [of the Due Process Clause,]” the right “would enable 
Congress to pass legislation attacking environmental degradation, [which] it 
could not [previously] reach through its regulatory powers under the 
[C]ommerce [C]lause.”91 Additionally, there are statutory pronouncements, like 
those found in the National Environmental Policy Act, which, while not directly 
enforceable as legislation, might rise to the level of a constitutional norm 
enforceable through the Due Process Clause or some other constitutional 
provision.92 
 
 86.  Id. at 109. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 191. See also id. at 193 (referring to the decision in Robinson Twp. v. 
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 1000 (Pa. 2013) and saying, “The court added that the Environmental Rights 
Amendment did not impose any absolute barrier to altering our natural landscape, but it afforded courts 
an ability to ensure that ‘on balance,’ the government ‘reasonably account[ed] for the environmental 
features.’”). 
 89.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 653 (“This effect would be particularly pronounced in regard to the 
Takings Clause and the doctrine of standing.”). 
 90.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 267–68 n.73 (“therefore, an [Environmental Quality Amendment] would 
need to reverse the Takings Clause in cases of environmental regulation and actively ‘tip’ government 
decision-making in favor of the environment when policy decisions present environment versus economy 
choices.”). Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 600. See also id. at 652–53 (“One meaning of the right to a healthy 
environment is that other rights should be viewed within an environmental perspective. That is the right 
to a healthy environment would interject environmental concerns into contexts in which the Court had 
previously raised other sorts of concerns.”); J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 486 (“[t]he peculiar phenomenon 
by which the exercise of property rights may subtly but irrevocably deprive the public of a natural 
environment warrants a preferred status for environmental rights.”). 
 91.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 486. 
 92.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 608 (“The history of federal constitutional protection of the 
environment should be conceptualized as including broad statutory language endorsing protection of the 
environment. Here, the record of concern for the environment is much stronger. Section 101(c) of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which states that ‘[t]he Congress recognizes that each person 
should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment’ is the most important such pronouncement. Such 
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A constitutionalized norm of environmental protection would help protect 
against “egregious” governmental abuses of the environment, “abuses which 
would fail any traditional balancing analysis.”93 According to David Boyd, 
“[c]onstitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment requires that 
all proposed laws and regulations be screened to ensure that they are consistent 
with the government’s duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the right.”94 This 
process may be formal or informal.95 Additionally, the possibility of judicial 
intervention could be used to force state legislatures to enact environmentally 
protective legislation96 and to defend against federal and/or state governmental 
efforts to turn back progress made in environmental protection since the 1970s.97 
One cannot help but wonder, if there were such a constitutional norm today, 
whether the current Administration would have such an easy time rescinding 
environmentally protective regulations and Congress such a free hand overriding 
or amending prior protective environmental laws.98 
A norm that is widely accepted by its inclusion in the Constitution usually 
has been internalized by the public.99 This will not require external enforcement, 
reducing concerns about the need for external enforcement.100 A constitutional 
environmental protection norm, even an aspirational one,101 could serve as a 
“roadmap” to help move a community or individuals to “a desired destination”—
here a more sustainable, risk-free, natural environment. It also might change the 
behavior of anti-environmental economic interests by overriding 
environmentally harmful behavior.102 Such a norm would also put the United 
States on a par with other countries that have done this, as well as with states that 
have incorporated protection of the environment into their constitutions.103 
 
language may not be directly enforceable, but it does announce a national policy under which enforceable 
constitutional norms may one day be derived.”). 
 93.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 194–95. 
 94.  David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, 54 ENV’T, 2012, at 3, 4. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 271 (“Where federal legislation cannot impose the policy over state 
resistance and the courts cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the stubborn states, an 
amendment is the only alternative. These are examples of institutional necessity, where an amendment, 
and only an amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move forward in society.”). 
 97.  Gallagher, supra note 78, at 126. 
 98.  See Climate Deregulation Tracker, supra note 27 (discussing environmental deregulation 
initiatives proposed by both the Trump Administration and Congress). 
 99.  Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 15 (citing Robert Cooter, Normative Failure of Theory 
of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 958–68 (1997)); see, e.g., Richard D. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 376 (1997). 
 100.  Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 15 (“norms are enforced by a set of nonlegal sanctions 
that apply to violators.”). See also id. at 15–16 (“In this regard, norm violators are expected to feel guilt 
and remorse notwithstanding the detection of the violation by others.”). 
 101.  Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 486 (“A norm should be non-utopian but aspirational.”). 
 102.  Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 14 (“Social norms may be another factor that could 
lead contracting parties to behave differently from the predictions of the traditional economic model.”). 
 103.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 162 (“A fundamental, or universally transcendent, right to a clean, 
healthy, and safe environment seems elemental. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment recognized how human dignity and freedom can only occur if our natural surroundings 
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“The value of having a constitutive source of law is to provide ‘an evolving 
repository of the nation’s core political ideals and . . . a record of the nation’s 
deepest ideological battles . . . .’”104 
By including an analysis of structural environmental constitutionalism into 
the current canon of environmental constitutionalism scholarship, we can 
identify imbalances in environmental governance authority and how to 
adjust those imbalances, facilitate more immediate practical impacts on 
environmental governance across scales, and lay a firm foundation for other 
forms of environmental constitutionalism, like fundamental.105 
The Supreme Court has never concluded that the Constitution does not 
protect environmental rights or contain an affirmative obligation that the 
government act to further environmental interests.106 However, there may be 
reasons why such a norm does not belong in the Constitution. 
First, because an individual right to a healthy environment is not 
“fundamental,” “deeply rooted in U.S. history,” nor clearly supported by 
constitutional text,107 it would be “a non-textual right.”108 While there might “be 
some textual provision nominally involved” in the creation of such a right or 
duty, it would not play a significant role.109 And non-textual rights generally 
have not been favored by the Court.110 When a court engages in protecting 
“unspecified ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental’ liberties, or ‘fair procedure’ or 
‘decency,’” it means courts can “give moral content to those conceptions” that 
will bind future generations.111 This transforms “the Court’s constitutional role” 
from “the technical and professional one of applying given norms to changing 
facts” into “the large and problematic role of discerning a society’s most basic 
contemporary values.”112 
 
afford an ability to live—for both present and future generations.”); see also id. at 163–64 (“. . . the 
European Convention on Human Rights recognizes how environmental threats interfere with the most 
basic of society’s obligations: protecting the right to life. And courts in Pakistan and the Netherlands have 
held in favor of recognizing rights threatened by climate change.”). 
 104.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 270 (quoting Tribe, supra note 74, at 441–42). See also Kalen, supra 
note 37, at 194 (“. . . it seems that environmental rights ought to be embedded within our legal lexicon as 
a reflection of what Lynton Caldwell characterizes as law’s ‘traditional function’ of ‘express[ing] the 
sense of the community regarding rights, wrongs, and obligations.’”). 
 105.  Blake Hudson, Structural Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 201, 215 
(2015). 
 106.  Hall, supra note 3, at 86 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has ironically never come to the presumably 
accepted conclusion that the U.S. Constitution does not protect environmental rights. Although naysayers 
may focus on the absence of approval, the equal absence of disapproval, implicit or otherwise, allows us 
to seriously consider whether the U.S. Constitution secures environmental rights.”). 
 107.  Id. at 105. See also Kalen, supra note 37, at 179–80 (discussing various constitutional 
amendments proposed in 1970, including one offered by Senator Nelson giving “[e]very person an 
‘inalienable right to a decent environment’ that would be ‘guarantee[d]’”). 
 108.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 592. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN L. REV. 703, 710 (1975). 
 112.  Id. 
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For this reason, prominent legal scholars like Herbert Wechsler and John 
Hart, as well as the Legal Process School, all contended that “the legitimacy of 
judicial review rests on the perception and reality that judges are engaged in an 
interpretive, rather than wholly creative, enterprise.”113 They worried that if the 
public believed “judges [were] merely imposing their own subjective moral 
preferences, rather than enforcing determinate constitutional constraints, judicial 
review might come under popular attack.”114 To them, there was no greater threat 
to the “appearance of principled decision making” than when the Court acted to 
protect “unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights.”115 As troubling, a 
constitutional environmental right would be novel and “novelty in law is the bête 
noire of traditional judicial restraint.”116 But, as Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote, 
[i]t is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case this court must act in 
an area so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these 
great . . . problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches of 
government. But these are . . . problems which seem at times to defy such 
resolution. In such situations, under our system, the judiciary must bear a 
hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the solution where 
constitutional rights hang in the balance.117 
Then, there is the worry that constitutionalizing environmental protection 
in some form will be “a pretext for litigation aimed merely at slowing down 
government action with which some particular group does not agree.”118 The 
fact that anyone might be able to enforce an environmental right or affirmative 
obligation might undermine the effective functioning of courts and threaten the 
principle of separation of powers.119 Judicial review of these claims might, thus, 
weaken the democratic process by moving the resolution of essentially political 
disputes into the courts.120 This, despite the fact that creating a constitutional 
norm of environmental protection is intended to broaden democratic processes 
and reduce the need for “substantive court intervention in environmental 
matters.”121 So-called judicial “democratic decision processes” can cause 
“circularities in the ordering of social values unless there is a fair uniformity or 
consensus as to those values and the standards for decision,” which there may 
 
 113.  Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
923, 1022 (2006). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 627. 
 117.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 479 (quoting D.C. Circuit Court Judge J. Skelly Wright in Hobson 
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). 
 118.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 657. 
 119.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 229. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
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not be in the case of an environmental protection norm.122 This may hinder a 
court asserting “perceived constitutional values in environmental matters.”123 
The doctrines of state action and standing could also be an issue if 
environmental protection crept into the Constitution, and the political question 
doctrine might create a barrier to the extent the government’s affirmative duties 
would be involved in any contested application of the norm or failure to apply 
the norm.124 Relief under a constitutional environmental protection norm might 
well depend on “whether a court could find state action, overcome problems of 
justiciability[,] or impose an affirmative duty of regulation on government 
officials; in many environmental cases, all three of these obstacles will challenge 
a court’s abilities.”125 
Another major problem in implementing any such norm would be 
establishing what constitutes unreasonable environmental degradation, which 
would be difficult and would require empirical data that might not be 
available.126 This could result in an unenforceable constitutional provision.127 
An unenforced constitutional norm would undermine its legitimacy, making it 
difficult for any future government to implement it.128 Assuming any 
enforcement problems associated with the norm could be overcome, 
implementation of any judicial decrees would likely “tax judicial resources,” as 
it might require “close court supervision of the degraders for an extended period 
of time.”129 
Then there are a host of structural problems with reading an environmental 
protection right or duty into the Constitution. First, the creation of a right or a 
duty is “inconsistent with the scheme of the Constitution, which couches 
guarantees in terms of freedom from governmental action.”130 Further, “[m]any 
theories about the nature and purpose of constitutions posit that ‘exceptional 
legal entrenchment’ is not just the hallmark of constitutions, but their raison 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 593. See J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 474 (“Thus, the viability of 
judicial activism in environmental cases will largely depend on whether the right of environment would 
be of the kind which the Supreme Court has given special treatment.”). 
 125.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 473–74 (“The vehicle for asserting a constitutional right of 
environment would be 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). See also id. (“Thus, if a federal court found sufficient 
government involvement in unreasonable environmental degradation to satisfy the state action 
requirement, it could presumably award equitable relief under section 1983 even though private parties 
were primarily responsible for the degradation.”). 
 126.  Id. at 477. 
 127.  Hall, supra note 3, at 105. 
 128.  Hudson, supra note 105, at 215 (“At some point, if fundamental provisions are in place, but are 
disregarded for long enough, there may be an erosion of institutional legitimacy for any future government 
seeking to actually implement those provisions.”). 
 129.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 479–80. 
 130.  Id. at 480. But see id. (“However, the idea that a state has a positive duty to remedy certain 
constitutional infringements has appeared in cases enforcing the equal protection rights of [African 
Americans] to attend racially nondiscriminatory public schools.”). 
754 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:735 
d’être.”131 Viewing the Constitution as a document that entrenches policies and 
rights “discourages the inclusion of highly specific policy choices,” like those 
that might be encompassed in any environmental protection norm, because those 
“specific policies are unlikely to remain appropriate or tenable in the face of 
changing economic and social conditions.”132 Additionally, adding an 
affirmative obligation to the Constitution would expand the power of the federal 
government, including the powers of the executive branch vis-à-vis the 
legislative branch, in contrast to “most constitutional provisions, which limit the 
powers of government.”133 It also might run afoul of other constitutional 
provisions like the Takings Clause134 or be used to slow economic 
advancement.135 Indeed, it is possible that claims advocating an expansion in 
direct judicial enforcement of constitutional environmental rights might actually 
interfere with contrary “popular and potentially transformative interpretations of 
the Constitution.”136 
And finally, it may not even be necessary to constitutionalize an 
environmental protection norm given the numerous statutory protections already 
in place137 and generally favorable “cultural attitudes towards environmental 
protection.”138 Current constitutional design placing environmental regulatory 
 
 131.  Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1641, 1700 (2014). 
 132.  Id. at 1701. 
 133.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 596–97. 
 134.  Id. See also id. at 632 (“[A] reinvigorated [T]akings [C]lause in particular and an economic 
perspective on the Court in general seem absolutely antithetical to constitutional recognition of 
environmental protection.”). 
 135.  Hall, supra note 3, at 107. See also Kalen, supra note 37, at 160–61 (referencing Lynton Keith 
Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 333–34 (1986) 
(“Lynton Caldwell wrote about how a stewardship ethic effectively collided with the assumption that 
society’s function is promoting economic value. ‘Environmental rights,’ he observed, ‘are inherently 
social rights, yet they have hitherto run a poor second to civil and human rights.’”)); Klipsch, supra note 
67, at 232 (“in Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., . . . the court concluded that constitutional litigation and the 
judicial process are ill-suited to solving problems of environmental control because of the delicate balance 
of competing social interests involved, because true solutions will require the application of specialized 
expertise, and because the inevitable tradeoffs between economic and ecological values should not be 
made through an ad hoc decision process.”). 
 136.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 620. 
 137.  Id. at 592. Hall, supra note 3, at 106 (“[N]o such right is necessary because of the current 
breadth of environmental statutes and cultural attitudes towards environmental protection.”). See also 
Gallagher, supra note 78, at 122 (“Dean Ottinger suspects that a constitutional amendment was not 
considered more carefully by Congress because Congress had already begun to pass landmark federal 
environmental legislation which would specifically address many of the environmental problems then in 
the forefront.”). Indeed, some have argued that “Congress preferred to avoid exposing all environmental 
laws to constitutional interpretation by not adopting an amendment.” Id. at 123. 
 138.  Hall, supra note 3, at 106. But see Schlickeisen, supra note 6, at 184 (“Most disturbing are a 
suite of problems not targeted by the abovementioned legislation, most of which have arisen or been 
identified since the early 1970s. These involve more subtle, long-term ecological degradation. They 
include global warming, ozone depletion, industrial chemicals that enter the food chain and disrupt 
hormones in humans and other animals, and, perhaps most importantly, biodiversity loss, which is 
uniquely menacing because of its accelerating speed and irreversibility.”). 
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authority within national and subnational jurisdictions might be “a structural 
form of environmental constitutionalism that may have as much, or more, impact 
than the protection of fundamental environmental rights within constitutional 
text,”139 obviating the need for a constitutional norm. 
Without question there are downsides to granting the environment some 
status in the Constitution, such as hostility toward increasing the power of the 
judiciary, creating an unenforceable constitutional right, creating internal 
tensions in the Constitution between potentially conflicting rights, creating a 
structural anomaly in the Constitution, undercutting the effectiveness of existing 
environmental laws, or imposing a heavy implementation burden on the courts. 
Nonetheless, the reasons favoring going ahead—principally the inability of any 
branch of the federal government, including the courts, to address and protect 
against the serious harms caused by global climate change, the opportunity to 
incorporate environmental concerns into constitutional deliberations involving 
the Takings Clause or standing doctrine, among others, the potential to block 
governmental actions in derogation of environmental protection, and the ability 
to educate the public about the importance of environmental protection—are 
sufficiently strong to warrant attempting to find a constitutional predicate for it. 
It is true that no one has found an environmental protection norm in the 
Constitution, and indeed, “as far as the environment is concerned, ‘the U.S. 
Constitution is silent.’”140 On the other hand, the fact that supporters of this goal 
continue to strive for it regardless makes the issue seem like one that “[will] not 
go away,” giving the repeated efforts some significance.141 In fact, “there is no 
impediment in the political Constitution to the derivation of expansive 
constitutional rights, particularly at a time in which the future of humankind may 
be at stake,” like in the case of climate change.142 
The next Part of the Article provides further support for this endeavor by 
discussing how interpreting the Constitution to include an environmental 
protection right or duty is consistent with accepted theories of constitutional 
interpretation as well as with state constitutions and the constitutions of other 
nations, which include this norm. 
 
 139.  Hudson, supra note 105, at 202. 
 140.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 606. 
 141.  Id. at 607–08 (“On the one hand, the continuing serious interest in an amendment tends to show 
fundamental societal concern for constitutional protection of the environment. On the other hand, of 
course, the need for an amendment tends to suggest that no implication of the right is possible or 
coherent.”). 
 142.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 620. 
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IV.  VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AS WELL AS STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF OTHER NATIONS SUPPORT A 
CONSTITUTIONALIZED NORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present and 
future. As our circumstances are new, we must think anew, and act anew. 
—Bruce Ledewitz143 
 
This Part of the Article explores various interpretative approaches to 
constitutional text that allow for finding support for non-textual rights in the 
Constitution. Many of the rights we enjoy today, like the right to privacy, are not 
articulated in the Constitution, but exist because of an expansive interpretation 
of a textual constitutional right or sometimes of the Constitution as a whole. One 
reason for this practice is the influence on the Constitution of common law, a 
body of law that evolves in response to social needs often to fill gaps left by 
incomplete positive law. These interpretive approaches to text create a level of 
comfort with going beyond the written words to find an embedded environmental 
protection norm in the Constitution. The inclusion of an environmental 
protection norm in state constitutions and in the constitutions of other countries 
provide additional support for doing this. 
A.  A Non-Textual Constitutionalized Environmental Protection Norm Is 
Consistent with Various Constitutional Interpretive Theories 
The Supreme Court plays a pivotal role in defining the scope of legal values 
as well as the pace that society establishes or preserves a normative value, like 
environmental protection.144 In this role, the Court sometimes engages in judicial 
policymaking where it establishes a policy that it believes reflects sound public 
policy without any direct input from statutory text or general directions from 
Congress. 
Arguments favoring more expansive and creative interpretations of 
constitutional provisions, such as the one urged on the reader below, require 
blurring the line between written and unwritten constitutions and relaxing 
notions of strict adherence to the text. 
 
 143.  Id. at 627 (quoting Marilyn C. Vernon & John W. Byrd, Leadership in the 21st Century: New 
Roles for Federal Probation and Pretrial Services Chiefs, 60 FED. PROB. 21, 27 (1996)). 
 144.  Erich Webb Bailey, Comment, Incorporating Ecological Ethics into Manifest Destiny: 
Sustainable Development, the Population Explosion, and the Tradition of Substantive Due Process, 21 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 473, 489 (2008) (“The history of the Supreme Court’s selective incorporation of 
‘unenumerated’ or negative rights into constitutional jurisprudence reveals a tension in the unique and 
powerful freedom the Supreme Court retains to define the legal scope of societal values, rights, and 
traditions.”). See also id. (“To the extent that the Supreme Court’s majority members perceive a reciprocal 
relationship between a particular issue and traditions deemed necessary to the American concept of 
‘ordered liberty,’ the Supreme Court has the capacity to abandon or advance common values otherwise 
immune to the democratic process.”). 
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A society can do plenty of writing about legal rules that stay “unwritten”; it 
can describe its customary traditions in academic treatises, formularies, case 
reports, and so on, while the traditions themselves remain purely customary. 
What makes them so, as Blackstone put it, is that “their original institutions 
and authority are not set down in writing, as acts of parliament are,” but they 
instead “receive their binding power, and the force of laws,” simply by usage 
and reception.145  
Professor Mark Tushnet contends that “the interpretive resources of 
American constitutional interpretation are sufficiently rich to support essentially 
any proposition about what the Constitution permits, requires, or prohibits.”146 
The “fiction of Ex Parte Young, the well-pleaded complaint rule, and the 
so-called Bivens action,” are all examples of “judicial policymaking”; each 
reflects to some extent “the Court’s view of sound public policy.”147 Professor 
Thomas Grey gives three additional examples where “courts have created (or 
found) independent constitutional rights with almost no textual guidance”: (1) 
“the contemporary right of privacy, and the older liberty of contract”; (2) 
instances where “the courts have given general application to norms that the 
constitutional text explicitly applies in a more limited way,” such as applying the 
Bill of Rights to the states under the due process clauses; and (3) where the 
extension or broadening of principles stated in the Constitution go beyond the 
normative content the Framers intended, citing as examples “the School 
Segregation Cases, and the extension of the [F]ourth [A]mendment to cover 
eavesdropping.”148 Professor Jeremy Waldron adds to the list by commenting 
that 
 
 145.  Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 160 (2017). See also Jeremy 
Waldron, Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1709 (2006) (“I have 
always found one of the most attractive features of Hart’s jurisprudence to be his insistence that at the 
foundation of every legal system lie certain basic rules which work more like customs or conventions than 
like the enacted textual rules.”). 
 146.  Brendon Swedlow, Reason for Hope? The Spotted Owl Injunctions and Policy Change, 34 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 825, 852 (2009). See also Stephen A. Siegel, Textualism on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial 
Provision, the “Petty Offense” Exception, and Other Departures from Clear Constitutional Text, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (2013) (“Mark Tushnet’s recent discussion of ‘constitutional workarounds,’ which 
he describes as instances where ‘[f]inding some constitutional text obstructing our ability to reach a 
desired goal, we work around that text using other texts—and do so without (obviously) distorting the 
tools we use.’”); see also id. at 94 (“there are credible grounds for suspecting that our constitutional 
tradition includes a fair number of departures from clear constitutional mandate.”). But, Mark Tushnet 
limits the circumstances in which these workarounds should occur, including “general agreement” that 
obstructing constitutional text is no longer sensible, to situations with “some substantial degree of 
bipartisan agreement” where the workaround “is constitutionally appropriate.” Mark Tushnet, 
Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (2009). He notes that “true workarounds,” 
which achieve a result that is inconsistent with another constitutional provision, gives the term workaround 
“a lightly seedy resonance.” Id. at 1506. 
 147.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 623. 
 148.  Grey, supra note 111, at 713 n.46. Grey additionally argues that there is an advantage to placing 
a controversial case in the third group because one might plausibly argue that the “extension of a specific 
constitutional prohibition really involves only the application of old norms to changed facts, and not a 
change in the norms themselves.” Id. 
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[t]here is no mention in [the Constitution] of the party system, or of primary 
elections, yet these are indispensable features of the American political 
structure. There is no textual norm in the Constitution to the effect that 
members of the [E]lectoral [C]ollege should vote for the presidential 
candidate supported by the voters in their state; yet clearly this operates as a 
convention and as an important feature of our system of election to this 
crucial office.149  
Thus, “it is not hard to identify important norms of the U.S. constitutional 
system” that “cannot be found in the text that we call ‘The United States 
Constitution.’”150 
Although everyone agrees that the text is in some sense controlling, in 
practice constitutional law generally has little to do with the text. Most of the 
time, in deciding a constitutional issue, the text plays only a nominal role. 
The issue is decided by reference to ‘doctrine’—an elaborate structure of 
precedents built up over time by the courts—and to considerations of 
morality and public policy.151  
Judgments that are reflected in doctrine “embody not just serious thought 
by one group of people or even one generation, but the accumulated wisdom of 
many generations,” and “reflect a kind of rough empiricism.”152 They are not 
based on “theoretical premises; rather, they have been tested over time, in a 
variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at least good enough.”153 In 
fact, constitutional text has not been the source of most of the important changes 
to the Constitution; rather, the impetus for these changes was either judicial 
decisions, fundamental political and social changes, or common law.154 
Constitutional change ultimately occurs over time, instead of all at once.155 
Although one might question “the wisdom and prudence of putting—or more 
 
 149.  Waldron, supra note 145, at 1711. See also Grey, supra note 111, at 713 (“While one might 
disagree with this rough catalogue on points of detail, it should be clear that an extraordinarily radical 
purge of established constitutional doctrine would be required if we candidly and consistently applied the 
pure interpretive model.”). 
 150.  Grey, supra note 111, at 717. See also Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 113, at 948 (“Winship is 
particularly significant because no express constitutional provision requires observance of the reasonable 
doubt standard; the standard is a matter of longstanding tradition and state governments have almost 
uniformly observed it. The question faced by the Supreme Court was whether a longstanding practice had 
morphed into a freestanding, non-textual, constitutional right.”). See 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 151.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 
(1996); see also Siegel, supra note 146, at 93 (“Constitutional praxis evidently has different norms, and 
teaches different lessons, from constitutional theory.”). 
 152.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 891–92. See also id. at 892 (referring to this kind of traditionalism 
and saying “[it] also subsumes the common-sense notion that one reason for following precedent is that it 
is simply too time consuming and difficult to reexamine everything from the ground up”). 
 153.  Id. at 891–92. See also id. at 904 (“What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of 
court, is the doctrine the courts have created, not the text.”); id. at 904 n.68 (quoting Holmes’s remark in 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 US 416, 433 (1920), “[t]he case before us must be considered in the light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago”); id. at 877, 892. 
 154.  Id. at 905. 
 155.  Id. at 884 (“Most of the great revolutions in American constitutionalism have taken place 
without any authorizing or triggering constitutional amendment.”). 
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accurately leaving—in the hands of judges the considerable power to define and 
enforce fundamental human rights without substantial guidance from 
constitutional text and history,”156 Grey notes that “constitutional commentators 
from Alexander Hamilton to Alexander Bickel” concluded that it made “some 
sense to give the final—or nearly final—say over the barrier between state and 
individual to the ‘least dangerous branch,’ the one that possesses neither purse 
nor sword.”157 
While one of the achievements of the Constitution “was the reduction to 
written form—and hence to positive law—of some of the principles of natural 
law,” it was recognized simultaneously that any written constitution could not 
“codify” higher law.158 The Ninth Amendment is the “textual expression” of the 
concept that there were unrecorded “principles of higher law” at the time the 
Constitution was written.159 More recently, constitutional rights, like the right of 
privacy and the right to travel, have not been derived from the Constitution’s 
text, nor based on “the natural-rights tradition of the [F]ounding [F]athers.”160 
More accurately, constitutional rights’ “rhetorical reference points are the Anglo-
American tradition and basic American ideals, rather than human nature, the 
social contract, or the rights of man.”161 Given this, Professor David Strauss 
wonders why we seem to have settled so heavily on the Constitution’s text.162 
He answers by saying that although the answer is “multifaceted,” there are two 
things that appear particularly important: “One is the specific way in which the 
Constitution was drafted; the other is the special status that the Constitution has 
in the American political culture,” giving the text special importance.163 Strauss 
additionally notes that there are “seldom . . . strong reasons to reject the text 
overtly; instead we can reinterpret it, within the boundaries of ordinary linguistic 
understandings, to reach a morally acceptable conclusion.”164 This approach 
toward text would appear to allow, at least, for interpreting the edges of 
 
 156.  Grey, supra note 111, at 714. 
 157.  Id. But see id. (questioning this conclusion and saying “one can ask the jurisprudential question 
whether as a general matter the defining and enforcing of basic rights without external textual guidance is 
essentially a judicial task”). 
 158.  Id. at 715–16. 
 159.  Id. at 716. 
 160.  Id. at 717. 
 161.  Id. See also id. (“But it is the modern offspring, in a direct and traceable line of legitimate 
descent, of the natural-rights tradition that is so deeply embedded in our constitutional origins.”). 
 162.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 914. See also Sachs, supra note 145, at 168 (“A society might use 
written legal instruments without using them in a particularly originalist way. And the converse is also 
true: you can have a bona fide originalism in a society that uses no written instruments at all. Which of 
the two, if either, appears in a given society is a matter of empirics, not of definition. If that’s right, then 
much of the constitutional theory of the past few decades—theory that’s placed crucial weight on concepts 
of writtenness—might need to be rewritten.”). 
 163.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 914. 
 164.  Id. 
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constitutional text as long as common understandings are not transgressed and 
the conclusion is deemed morally acceptable by a consensus of the population.165 
One force for interpretive growth of the Constitution has been the 
document’s relationship to common law.166 It was a standard nineteenth-century 
interpretive approach to the Constitution, which continued into the twentieth 
century,167 to read common law norms into the Constitution.168 For Strauss, 
modern U.S. constitutional law “represents a flowering of the common law 
tradition.”169 
Common law evolves in response to changes in society and in society’s 
needs, and thus functions “as a window into that community’s ever adjusting and 
presumably ‘shared’ values.”170 It reflects “changing societal behavioral norms,” 
which courts “canvas” and then use to justify adjusting society’s rules.171 Using 
the common law as a surrogate for contemporary observance, “[o]ur common 
law heritage equally demonstrates how arresting environmental threats is 
unmistakably infused into our legal fabric.”172 
The common law approach “accepts, without apology, that we depart from 
past understandings, and that we are often creative in interpreting the text.”173 
 
 165.  Id. at 915–16 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (“When the examples which 
fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect. . . . [T]he most 
rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on 
its side.”)). 
 166.  Id. at 935 (“Gradual innovation, in the hope of improvement, has always been a part of the 
common law tradition, as it has been a part of American constitutionalism.”). See also id. at 879 (“This 
form of traditionalism, characteristic of the common law method, calls for recognizing the value of 
conclusions that have been arrived at, over time, by an evolutionary process; . . .”). 
 167.  Siegel, supra note 146, at 108 n.89 (2013) (referencing Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 
69 (1904)). 
 168.  Id. at 108. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 535, 549–50 (1999) (arguing that normative constitutional theorists converge on advancing three 
principal values—justice, the rule of law, and democracy); see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE (1986) (arguing that valid legal principles are derived from a moralistic interpretive process). 
 169.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 887. Strauss notes in addition that “[i]n some of these instances—
notably the expansion of the congressional commerce power and the enforcement of gender equality—
amendments bringing about the changes were actually rejected, but the changes occurred anyway.” Id. at 
884. 
 170.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 173. See also Strauss, supra note 151, at 929 (“[P]rinciples developed 
through the common law method are not likely to stay out of line for long with views that are widely and 
durably held in the society.”). 
 171.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 172. Fundamental liberty interests, including the right to marry and 
reproduce, have also emerged through the common law process, particularly where the Court has found 
the rights engrained in the nation’s history and tradition or essential to the pursuit of happiness. See, e.g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding that freedom to marry is essential to the pursuit of 
happiness); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that the right to procreate is 
fundamental to the survival of the species); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing 
liberty as the freedom to partake in activities “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”) (cited in 
Michael O’Loughlin, Note, Understanding the Public Trust Doctrine Through Due Process, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 1321, 1329 n.59 (2017)). 
 172.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 172. 
 173.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 934–35. 
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Under that approach, courts identify “what is truly at stake” in a dispute and 
determine whether, in an effort to “make the law fairer or more just,” a court 
should depart from long-held understandings.174 Grey reasons: “If common law 
development is an appropriate judicial function, falling within the traditionally 
accepted judicial role, is not the functionally similar case-by-case development 
of constitutional norms appropriate as well?”175 
On the other hand, the first component of common law constitutional 
interpretation “is traditionalist. The central idea is that the Constitution should 
be followed because its provisions reflect judgments that have been accepted by 
many generations in a variety of circumstances. The second component is 
conventionalist.”176 In other words, courts “should be very careful about 
rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good 
faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted 
over time.”177 A shorthand way of explaining the pull of relying on tradition in 
interpreting the Constitution is that it is nothing more than giving “the benefit of 
the doubt to past practices.”178 Neither of these ideologies favor an interpretation 
that finds an environmental protection norm somehow embedded in the 
Constitution: an environmental protection norm neither reflects the judgment of 
past generations nor is it conventional in any way. And, while courts, in common 
law cases, “occasionally employ ‘rights’ language when indicating that citizens 
are entitled to a healthy environment,” they will frequently balance any equity 
that “tolerates economic progress”179 against those rights. Further, common law 
claims alleging threatened injuries from global climate change and seeking 
remedial action have had a “spotty record”180 in the courts, at best. 
Interpretative flexibility, moreover, does not mean the Constitution can be 
read to mean anything at any specific moment; some interpretive propositions 
will be “off-the-wall” and others not “legally credible.”181 While a “neutral and 
durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever,” “if it lacks 
 
 174.  Id. at 935. 
 175.  Grey, supra note 111, at 715. 
 176.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 891. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 895. See also id. at 891 (“traditionalism . . . based on humility and, related, a distrust of 
the capacity of people to make abstract judgments not grounded in experience”); but see Waldron, supra 
note 145, at 1701 (“[W]e call something an element of positive morality precisely because it is regarded 
by an ‘aggregate of persons’ with ‘a sentiment of aversion or liking.’”). 
 179.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 173–74. 
 180.  Id. at 174. See, e.g., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding 
that a claim asserting that public trust doctrine imposes affirmative duty on federal government to abate 
harm caused by climate change lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 
(2014); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
Clean Air Act displaced Kivalina’s claim for common law nuisance damages). But see Juliana v. United 
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1276 (D. Or. 2016) (allowing claim that government’s failure to abate 
climate change has violated plaintiffs’ rights to life, liberty, and property and violated public trust doctrine 
to go forward). 
 181.  Swedlow, supra note 146, at 852. 
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connection with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a 
constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.”182 Professor 
of Political Science Brendon Swedlow responds that even if the proposition is 
“‘off-the-wall,’” it can become “‘legally credible’” if there is political or cultural 
support for it—“[t]he key thing, . . . is that the interpretations have to be accepted 
by lawyers and judges and ultimately by the broader political world. ‘Acceptance 
depends on a favorable political environment . . . and the resources to exploit the 
opportunities that environment provides.’”183 
Strauss observes that change in constitutional doctrine only occurs after “the 
groundwork” for such a change has been laid: when “either the old doctrine 
proved unstable on its own terms, or changes in society made it seem wrong,” 
and when the new doctrine was grounded, mostly, “on considerations of policy 
and social justice.”184 If that observation is correct, then the question is whether 
sufficient “groundwork” has been laid to support constitutionalizing an 
environmental protection norm. The next subpart discusses how most U.S. states 
and most countries have included an environmental protection norm in their 
constitutions, and how that experience might constitute adequate groundwork to 
justify the norm’s inclusion in the U.S. Constitution. 
B.  Most States and Other Countries Have Constitutionalized a Norm of 
Environmental Protection 
With respect to the inclusion of an environmental protection right or duty, 
the Federal Constitution is out of step with its state counterparts and with most 
of the constitutions of other nations. This subpart discusses both circumstances. 
Since the formation of the United States, “Americans have written one 
[F]ederal Constitution and 149 state constitutions.”185 The majority of these state 
constitutions “contain positive rights, such as a right to free education, labor 
rights, social welfare rights, and environmental rights.”186 Therefore, positive 
rights are not “foreign to the American constitutional tradition.”187 An 
 
 182.  Grey, supra note 111, at 704 (quoting John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment 
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973)). 
 183.  Swedlow, supra note 146, at 852. 
 184.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 905. Grey raises a deeper question and that is whether “a 
‘fundamental law’ judicially enforced in a climate of historical and cultural relativism [is] the legitimate 
offspring of a fundamental law which its exponents felt expressed rationally demonstrable, universal, and 
immutable human rights?” Grey, supra note 111, at 718. 
 185.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1705. The authors add that there have been “twenty-
seven amendments to the [F]ederal Constitution and thousands of amendments to. . . . [U.S.] state 
constitutions.” Id. 
 186.  Id. at 1645. See also id. at 1683 (citing PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27) (“As of 2012, thirty state 
constitutions included one or more provisions requiring the government to care for the poor or the 
disabled; eleven required the state to set minimum wages or a maximum workday; sixteen protected the 
right to unionize; nine required the government to regulate workplace safety; and fourteen protected the 
right to a clean and healthy natural environment.”). 
 187.  Id. at 1645. 
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environmental right is a positive right, and thus it is no surprise to find that state 
“constitutions historically [have] recognized rights to water, fisheries, and other 
resources,” some even adding environmental quality to “the list of fundamentals” 
more recently.188 A 1996 survey found that only eighteen state constitutions do 
not contain at least one substantive environmental provision.189 Many of the 
western states have “enshrine[d] water rights in their constitutions.”190 
Professors Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin conjecture that the first Earth Day, 
in 1970, may have prompted several state legislatures to add environmental 
rights provisions to their constitutions.191 
“The expanding scope of [state] constitutions is commonly associated with 
growth in the scope of governments’ responsibilities . . . and decreased 
restrictions on government.”192 Since increasing governmental responsibilities 
does not always lead to restrained government,193 constitutions are frequently 
drafted “with the express intention of limiting government discretion” by 
constraining legislative policy choices.194 Sometimes, states will even include 
specific instructions in their constitutions about how they want provisions to be 
interpreted and implemented.195 Thus, by converting a wide range of topics into 
state constitutional matters, “popular majorities have attempted to maintain 
 
 188.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 181–82 (listing as examples Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia). See also Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1691 n.212 
(quoting PA CONST. art I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation 
of the natural, scenic, historic[,] and esthetic values of the environment.”)); In re Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d 
1, 23 (Haw. 2017) (The Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the Sierra Club and its members had asserted 
a property interest in a clean and healthful environment, protectable under the Hawai‘i Constitution’s due 
process clause). 
 189.  Gallagher, supra note 78, at 131. See also id. at 132 (“State provisions fall into three main 
categories: public access and use provisions, policy statements, and individual rights (to a clean or 
healthful environment or a similar right).”). 
 190.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1683–84. See also id. at 1659 (noting that both state 
constitutions and the constitutions of other countries have expanded to include “fiscal policy and economic 
development, management of natural resources, and matters of cultural significance and citizen 
character”); id. at 1681 (“A cursory glance at the world’s constitutions reveals that an overwhelming 
majority do contain explicit socioeconomic rights, such as the right to education, health care, housing, 
social security, work, workplace safety, water, and food.”). 
 191.  Id. at 1692. 
 192.  Id. at 1660–61. The authors note that this second point is particularly intuitive in the context of 
the U.S. Constitution, “which, as a document of enumerated powers, has long been understood to deprive 
the federal government of a wide range of powers simply by declining to address them,” and might reflect 
the fact that constitutional constraints on government have been relaxed. See id. at 1661 
 193.  Id. at 1661 (“Yet governments with more responsibilities are not necessarily unconstrained 
governments. Increased constitutional scope does not automatically track increased government 
discretion.”). 
 194.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1661. See also id. at 1662 (“[C]onstitutional drafters 
may increase constitutional scope in order to limit governmental discretion.”); id. at 1662 (“In some cases, 
constitutional expansion has constrained government not by forcing it to accept new responsibilities, but 
by expressly prohibiting the adoption of particular policies. For instance, constitution makers at both the 
state and national level have often used constitutions to correct or preempt certain government behaviors 
regarding fiscal and economic behavior.”). 
 195.  Id. at 1667. 
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better control over their officeholders, forcing legislatures to take on important 
social roles and preventing those legislatures from repeating disastrous policy 
choices.”196 As discussed earlier, the inclusion of an environmental protection 
norm in the Federal Constitution would help citizens persuade federal 
officeholders to abate the adverse effects of climate change and prevent 
initiatives to increase those effects.197 It might also induce Congress to become 
positively proactive on the topic of climate change.198 
Not only is the Federal Constitution anomalous when it comes to state 
constitutions with respect to the inclusion of an environmental protection norm, 
it is also an anomaly in the world community. Including the emerging Eastern 
European democracies, “virtually every constitution adopted or revised since 
1970 . . . either state[s] the principle that an environment of a specified quality 
constitutes a human right or impose[s] environmental duties upon the state.”199 
The right to a healthy environment follows the right to strike and unionize as 
among the most common provisions found in the world’s constitutions.200 
Ninety-two countries have determined that this right warrants constitutional 
status since the mid-1970s.201 Even in countries with constitutions that “merely 
enshrine negative rights,” those constitutions “commonly recognize positive 
governmental obligations that flow from these negative obligations,” and that 
“governments can violate negative-rights clauses by not acting or by failing to 
prevent rights abuses by private citizens.”202 
In a recent decision, the High Court of Ireland, in Friends of the Irish 
Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, declined to give petitioners the 
specific relief they wanted, but recognized a new constitutional right to the 
environment in the country’s constitution as consistent with the human dignity 
and well-being of citizens at large, saying, 
[a] right to an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and 
well-being of citizens at large is an essential condition for the fulfilment of 
all human rights. It is an indispensable existential right that is enjoyed 
universally, yet which is vested personally as a right that presents and can be 
 
 196.  Id. Versteeg and Zackin acknowledge that many reject state constitutions as a model because 
they “are so different in form and function from the national Constitution,” and that the breadth of their 
scope, “elaborate detail, and frequent revision” make them seem more like laws and less “constitutional,” 
but argue that it may be “time to revisit and revise this conclusion” because the “features of state 
constitutions that have drawn such derision from American legal scholars are standard features of 
constitutions around the world.” Id. at 1706. 
 197.  See supra pp. 113–17 (discussing effect of including an environmental protection norm in the 
Constitution). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 604. See also id at 601 (“The existence and use of environmental 
rights internationally suggests that such rights can be a matter of practical constitutional interpretation.”). 
 200.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1685. See also Boyd, supra note 94, at 5 (“Portugal (in 
1976) and Spain (1978) were the first countries to include the right to a healthy environment in their 
constitutions.”). 
 201.  Boyd, supra note 94, at 5. 
 202.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1682. 
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seen always to have presented, and to enjoy protection, under Art. 40.3.1° of 
the Constitution.203 
The Norwegian constitution grants every person “a right to an environment 
that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose productivity and 
diversity are maintained” and directs that “[n]atural resources should be managed 
on the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations whereby this right will 
be safeguarded for future generations as well.”204 Section twenty-four (1996) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that “[e]veryone has the 
right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations[.]”205 
The effect of these constitutional provisions has been to strengthen 
environmental laws in seventy-eight out of the ninety-two countries that adopted 
them.206 Some countries with a constitutional right to a healthy environment 
have used it to close gaps in their environmental laws. Professor David Boyd 
cites Costa Rica and Nepal as examples of countries with an environmental 
protection norm in their constitutions whose courts ordered their governments to 
enact laws and regulations to protect fisheries and lessen air pollution.207 Courts 
in these countries “have consistently held that laws, regulations, and 
administrative actions that violate the constitutional right to a healthy 
environment will be struck down.”208 
The practical impact in countries with these constitutional provisions is that 
they have “smaller ecological footprints” and have “made faster progress in 
reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and greenhouse gases than 
nations without such provisions.”209 According to Versteeg and Zackin, the 
socioeconomic rights, like rights to a healthy environment and to education, 
found both in state constitutions and the constitutions of other countries, have 
forced “those governments to enact reforms that the political and economic 
environment might render particularly challenging to achieve.”210 
Boyd argues that “when the consistent relationship between constitutional 
provisions and superior environmental performance is combined with the 
evidence of stronger environmental legislation, enhanced opportunities for 
 
 203.  Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council [2017] IEHC 695 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 204.  Model Provisions and Statute, supra note 44, at 3. 
 205.  See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1691 n.212. 
 206.  Boyd, supra note 94, at 5 (“Laws were amended to specifically focus on environmental rights, 
as well as access to environmental information, participation in decision making, and access to justice.”). 
 207.  Id. at 7. See also id. at 8 (“Courts have ruled that the constitutional right to a healthy 
environment imposes three duties upon government: to respect the right by not infringing it through state 
action; to protect the right from infringement by third parties (which may require regulations, 
implementation, and enforcement); and to take actions to fulfill the right (e.g., by providing services 
including clean water, sanitation, and waste management.”)). 
 208.  Boyd, supra note 94, at 8. 
 209.  Id. at 11. 
 210.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1699. 
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public participation in environmental governance, and increasing enforcement of 
environmental laws, the case for entrenching environmental protection in 
national constitutions must be regarded as compelling.”211 Yet, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the United States’ Constitution as not including positive 
rights, let alone “a requirement that the government take affirmative action to 
protect recognized negative rights.”212 The Court “has rejected constitutional 
claims to housing, to public education, and to medical services, on the view that 
the government does not owe its citizens any affirmative duty of care.”213 
The fact that so many states and countries recognize a right to a healthy 
environment, or something equivalent to that, makes it harder to dismiss the 
recognition of such a right under the Federal Constitution “as a merely subjective 
judgment.”214 Kalen comments that the “international community’s emerging 
dialogue surrounding a human right to water, or a right to survive the effects of 
rising sea levels that threaten an entire community and culture’s existence, offers 
an apropos moment for reflecting on how such rights might become cemented 
within our constitutional fabric.”215 The only remaining task for this Article then 
is to find a textual or extratextual constitutional home for it in the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the next and final Part of the Article turns to that task. 
V.  A CONSTITUTIONAL HOME FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION RIGHT 
OR DUTY 
On similar ground it may be proved that no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living 
generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they 
please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their own persons, and 
consequently may govern them as they please. 
—Thomas Jefferson216  
 
 
 211.  Boyd, supra note 94, at 8. 
 212.  Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1681. The U.S. Constitution “stand[s] out as ‘a charter 
of negative rather than positive liberties.’” Id. at 1682. 
 213.  See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 & nn.2–5 (1999) (cited in Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 
1681 n.179 (citations omitted)). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 
189, 196 (1989) (no “affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to 
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual” 
can be found in the Due Process Clauses). 
 214.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 601. 
 215.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 171–72; Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 600–01 (To the extent the United 
States does not recognize an environmental right or acts in contravention of that right, when so many other 
countries recognize it, creates an impression that the United States “is seeking its own advantage as the 
world’s wealthiest nation”). 
 216.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, at 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
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Some scholars have proposed amending the Constitution to add an 
environmental protection right or duty.217 Because of the low likelihood of 
success for such an initiative in the current political environment, this Article 
investigates whether the same result could be achieved through judicial 
interpretation of constitutional text.218 More specifically, this Part examines the 
possibility that the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the 
Ninth Amendment, or other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights might 
individually or collectively provide a possible base for an environmental 
protection norm, as well as whether there are extratextual rationales for it. This 
Part opens with a discussion of what an environmental protection right or duty 
might look like before determining whether it could fit into one of the homes 
identified above. 
A.  What an Interpretative Constitutional Environmental Protection Norm 
Might Look Like 
An interpretive norm can be functional—its principal purpose to change 
how government operates, prohibit specific governmental activity, create new or 
affirm existing rights, or merely express an aspirational goal.219 Alternatively, 
its primary purpose may be to define relationships between or within various 
government entities, between the government and citizens, or relationships 
between citizens.220 Regardless of its purpose, if the interpretive norm, whether 
in the form of a right or a duty, is to survive, it must be “socially acceptable and 
institutionally necessary,” as well as implementable by political and legal 
institutions.221 The interpretations must be reducible to binding legal principles, 
“sufficiently clear to minimize unanticipated interpretations,” and “enduring 
even in the face of shifting political climates.”222 The question remains even after 
application of these filters whether interpreting the Constitution to include an 
environmental protection right or duty would be such an “outlier” interpretation 
as to warrant “extreme caution.”223 Ruhl appears to put the right to a clean 
 
 217.  See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 249 n.14 (listing and critiquing some of those articles). 
 218.  The low likelihood of amending the Constitution in the present fractious political environment 
makes Professor Tushnet’s “workaround” theory particularly appealing as an alternative to “amending the 
Constitution without altering its text, in the same family as judicial interpretation and ‘constitutional 
moments.’” Tushnet, supra note 146, at 1510. 
 219.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 253. Although Ruhl is discussing constitutional amendments and using 
a biaxial matrix to evaluate those amendments, the matrix and discussion are a useful way of thinking 
about interpreting the Constitution. He notes that very few amendments have an aspirational function or 
address the citizen-citizen relation target, and none does both, i.e. “establish aspirations for citizen-citizen 
relations.” Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 264 (explaining how “it does not seem unreasonable to ask of any proposed social policy 
amendment whether it is socially acceptable and institutionally necessary”). Ruhl refers to these 
qualifications as “filters.” Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 261 (“Hence, while I do not go so far as to suggest we should disqualify proposed outlier 
amendments per se, I believe the history of the existing amendments forcefully supports the case that we 
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environment in that outlier category, commenting that “other rights of a free 
society . . . are already constitutive ‘givens’ for society.”224 
The effect of these “filters” is to narrow down substantially what such a 
right or duty might look like. According to Ruhl, only those that are “the most 
accepted, important, necessary, enforceable, clear, and enduring need apply for 
a position in the Constitution.”225 Ruhl notes that most of the existing 
amendments to the Constitution are “prohibitory” in nature, so to the extent rights 
are established, they are established by “negative implication,” pointing to all or 
parts of the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as 
those parts of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporating due process rights 
against the states, to prove his point.226 So an environmental protection norm 
added to the Constitution by interpretation, just like an amendment, must be 
drafted in a way that fits comfortably in the dominant pattern. Accepting Ruhl’s 
statement, any interpretive norm would be best stated either as a specific right 
that cannot be violated, like the Ninth Amendment, or a prohibition against 
something negative happening to protected individuals, like the Tenth 
Amendment, with the government as the implied actor. An open-ended right or 
duty would not fit. 
Since any amendment or interpretation of the Constitution “is a profoundly 
political question,” there must be a sufficiently large segment of society that 
believes in the message conveyed by the proposal—large enough to approach 
consensus, even if the majority of people are indifferent to it, and broad and deep 
enough to avoid the appearance of a faction or special interest group.227 Since 
the principal function of any text, let alone constitutional text, is to offer “a ready-
made solution that is acceptable to everyone,” an interpretation of the text that 
struck most people as contrived would subvert the text’s function.228 When 
consensus for an interpretation is lacking, the interpretation is premature.229 
 
should approach future outlier proposals with extreme caution.”). See also id. (“But the fact that we have 
stayed on a path away from outlier amendments, whether that has been by deliberate policy or by accident, 
makes the case for staying on that path more powerful.”). 
 224.  Id. at 264. 
 225.  Id. at 255. 
 226.  Id. at 257–58. Additionally, Ruhl notes that although the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Amendments were considered to have embodied pre-existing rights at the time of ratification, their texts 
“purport to create or affirm rights.” Id. at 258. 
 227.  Id. at 265–66. See also Strauss, supra note 151, at 907 n.72 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 134–40 (1993) and saying “[i]t is crucial to Rawls’s idea that the political conception is 
willingly affirmed by the holders of different comprehensive views, as fully consistent with their 
comprehensive views”). 
 228.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 913. 
 229.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 186 n.109 (citing Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the 
Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 
198 (2003) (“[Thompson] concludes, however, that it is premature to establish such a right before a 
sufficient consensus emerges.”)). See also Ruhl, supra note 3, at 265–66 (“An amendment made possible 
by the majority’s indifference, or born of revolutionary zeal, may present unanticipated political turmoil 
after ratification when its support is tested by the realities of implementation.”). Ruhl discounts the 
urgency behind the push by environmentalists to amend the Constitution as little more than a “political 
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Kalen has just this concern about a constitutionalized environmental 
norm—he worries that there may be a lack of “social consensus on the general 
goal of a ‘healthful environment.’”230 While this may be true with respect to such 
a general goal, in part because of the difficulty of giving context to that goal, this 
Article argues that the discrete issue of global climate change, because both its 
impacts and potential remedies are broadly understood by the vast majority of 
people, as discussed in Part I, has social consensus. 
Additionally, any change to the Constitution, either through interpretation 
or amendment, must be capable of being implemented. To be implementable, 
according to Ruhl, any interpretation creating an environmental protection norm 
must be enforceable, clear, and durable.231 Without some means of enforcing the 
norm, it may dissolve “into aspirational emptiness . . . ultimately losing its 
constitutive impact.”232 Although “[n]o purely aspirational expressions exist in 
any amendments to the Constitution,”233 Kalen believes that there is room for an 
aspirational right in the Constitution, one that fosters community values and 
“expresses a vision for a value that has emerged through our democratic 
process.”234 He notes that Sax “captured this idea when he expressed how an 
environmental right furthers the ideals of a democratic society founded on 
principles of self-government.”235 Theoretically, citizens consent to live in a 
society that imposes limits on them, in exchange for which society has an 
“affirmative obligation to do what it can to maintain a ‘minimal level of 
substantive protection.’”236 The argument here is that society has an obligation 
to protect its members from environmental harm. Thus, an aspirational 
environmental right, like an aspirational “right to personal security, personal 
freedom, basic protections against poverty, or emergency medical assistance” 
reflects “our society’s appreciation for the fundamental role the environment 
plays in the health and welfare of individuals.”237 
 
rumble” and not a “matter of institutional structure that can only be solved through an amendment to the 
Constitution.” Id. at 272–75. 
 230.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 185–86 (quoting Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and 
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 898 (1996)) 
(“Professor Thompson suggests that recognizing an environmental right is more problematic than other 
constitutional rights because of a lack of ‘societal consensus on the general goals of a ‘healthful 
environment.’’”)). Thompson adds, according to Kalen, that natural resource issues may “present a 
slightly stronger process justification for a constitutional provision than pollution issues present.” 
Thompson, Jr., supra at 899. 
 231.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 275. 
 232.  Id. See also Hudson, supra note 105, at 214. But see Kalen, supra note 37, at 192 (“[A]n 
aspirational right to a healthy environment can be enforced judicially through traditional balancing.”). 
 233.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 258 (“[T]he absence of aspirational text in the United States Constitution 
is one of its defining characteristics.”). 
 234.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 190. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
770 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:735 
The terms of any norm must also be definable, the parameters of any 
prohibitions must be sufficiently clear, and any expression of rights capable of 
being translated into enforcement methods.238 An interpretation that does not 
clearly describe the right or duty could “lead to unintended interpretations and 
applications.”239 Clarity and durability also relate to enforceability because, as 
noted above, an unclear norm cannot be enforced. 
This is all fine on a meta plane. However, as Kalen notes, the “proverbial 
Devil . . . lurks behind any conversation about the details of what precisely it 
means to have a right.”240 For example, to whom does the right belong, is the 
right a “positive or negative one,” and against whom may the right be claimed; 
alternatively, which entity has an obligation to respect such a right?241 The 
definitional problems associated with a norm that merely imposes duties on 
others may share some of the same problems when defining a “healthy” 
environment. However, to the extent that executive agencies have determined 
standards for a “healthy” environment, that determination could be folded into 
the government’s duty to protect individuals from any harm that might result 
from a drop below that set level. 
There is also an obvious tension between wanting to make a text sufficiently 
permanent and stable and not imposing one generation’s social norms onto future 
generations, which might lead to “grave mistakes.”242 The “key . . . is to decide 
which objects of government are permanent and which are not, and then devise 
a text that captures the appropriate balance between stability and flexibility.”243 
Protecting the world from the adverse effects of climate change is rapidly 
becoming a goal of the present generation and, since future generations will be 
the most affected if climate change is not averted or mitigated, there should be 
little, if any, subversion of those future interests by the creation now of an 
enforceable right or duty in the Constitution to protect them. 
With this guidance in mind, the next subpart turns to where an 
environmental norm might fit in the Constitution. 
 
 238.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 276. 
 239.  Id. at 278. See also Hall, supra note 3, at 109 (noting his belief that such a right may be 
“carefully described”). 
 240.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 187. 
 241.  Id. Kalen provides a partial answer—“a right to a healthy environment embraces the 
characteristics of both negative and positive rights—and, as such, I call it a transcendent aspirational 
right.” Id. at 188. 
 242.  Ruhl, supra note 3, at 279 (“the text of an amendment must balance between stability and 
flexibility with respect to the future”). See also id. (“An amendment’s ability to freeze social policy into 
future generations makes it an attractive source of permanence.”). 
 243.  Id. (quoting JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATEs 92 (1994)); see 
also Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1669 (“[T]he US Constitution and the politics surrounding it 
are characterized by an unusual degree of concern for the document’s stability. This mindset is reflected 
in a pervasive veneration of the Constitution’s origins and in Americans’ general reluctance to alter it.”). 
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B.  Where an Interpretative Environmental Protection Norm Might Fit in the 
Constitution 
Professor Ronald Klipsch identifies two potential approaches to finding 
constitutional support for environmental rights: one would be to find them in 
individual constitutional guarantees, such as in the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses; the other would be to find that the entire Constitution 
provides a source for them.244 He prefers the approach in which each 
constitutional guarantee is viewed independently because it is more consistent 
with traditional analysis and because the “right would bear a traditional name,” 
like a due process violation, instead of finding that an untethered environmental 
right had somehow been infringed.245 He notes, however, that the narrowness of 
this approach would “foreclose any broad rights for the preservation of 
ecosystems.”246 The second approach, which looks to the “Constitution as a 
whole, including the [P]reamble,” would be broader and thus “more consistent 
with the rights sought by ecologists.”247 
Ledewitz sees the Constitution as “a kind of intergenerational deal we make 
with ourselves,” in which “extraordinary majorities of the past have the power to 
trump contemporary majorities.”248 He adds that an even “more meaningful way 
to think about this, especially since the [F]ramers no doubt thought that being 
bound by the Constitution was beneficial for future generations, is to treat the 
Constitution as an intra-family relationship.”249 
This subpart, following Klipsch’s approach, first looks at various provisions 
of the Constitution to see if one or more of them might include an environmental 
protection right or duty, such that its breach would violate specific constitutional 
text.250 It then looks at the Constitution as a whole to see if collectively the 
document supports an environmental protection norm and thus can be the source 
of an individual right to protection from environmental harm or an affirmative 
duty on the government to respect and protect it. 
 
 244.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 210. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 210–11. See also Hall, supra note 3, at 108 (“The U.S. Constitution secures the right to a 
basic level of environmental quality needed for the exercise of all other constitutional rights.”); id. at 109 
(“A constitutional right to a minimal environment would be fundamental and deeply rooted within the 
United States because otherwise no constitutional protections would be secured.”). 
 248.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 661. See also id. at 662 (“That kind of contract-sounding language—
third party beneficiaries and consideration and so forth—is one way to think of the rights of future 
generations under the Constitution.”). 
 249.  Id. at 662. 
 250.  Tushnet’s “workaround” theory flags workarounds of constitutional provisions that “reflect 
such deep commitments” that are “truly basic to the Constitution” as potentially “worrisome.” Tushnet, 
supra note 146, at 1507. He terms these commitments as making up what he calls the “thin Constitution,” 
as opposed to the “thick Constitution,” which includes its organizational details. Id. at 1507. Each of the 
provisions discussed in this Part are part of Tushnet’s “thin Constitution.” Yet even these provisions may 
be worked around when there is sufficient will to do that. Id. at 1514. 
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1.  The Due Process Clause 
The most likely home for an interpretive environmental protection norm is 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since the turn of the last 
century, courts have used the due process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments “as a constitutional reservoir of values to support a broad spectrum 
of limitations upon conduct-regulating and enforcement policies of the state and 
national governments.”251 The Supreme Court, in its first attempt at construing 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, stated that the phrase due process 
“conveyed the same meaning as the phrase ‘law of the land’ as used in the Magna 
Carta six and a half centuries earlier.”252 
A positive feature of the Due Process Clause for purposes of this analysis is 
its ability to adapt to changing times.253 Constitutional principles are generally 
dynamic.254 This dynamic feature of constitutional rights, including the Due 
Process Clause, appears particularly suited for “some latent ‘right’ to a healthy 
environment.”255 As Professor Caleb Hall says, “[t]o argue that due process does 
not encompass some yet unforeseen right because of history alone uses the same 
logic that denies the existence of substantive due process itself.”256 
The Due Process Clause constrains “law-making and guards against 
arbitrary or irrational government intrusions into protected rights. As such, it 
serves as one of the primary checks on state exercise of the police power.”257 
When the challenged governmental action has a “proper public purpose, such as 
serving the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,” government action 
 
 251.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 222. 
 252.  O’Loughlin, supra note 171, at 1326 (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856)). 
 253.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 465–66 (arguing that “the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
increasing receptiveness to a generalized ‘right to be let alone,’” and that “the evolving character of the 
‘right to be let alone’ suggests that due process is not a static concept”). The author of the Note uses as an 
example the willingness of the Court to recognize a “right to be let alone” as a base to expand the 
individual’s aura of constitutional protection to include the integrity of his natural surroundings. Id. See 
also Hall, supra note 3, at 94 (“After Lochner, the field of rights protected by substantive due process 
continued to expand.”). 
 254.  Kalen, supra note 37, at 167 (“Constitutional principles, moreover, are dynamic—regardless of 
whether one ascribes to a living Constitution theory.”). 
 255.  Id. at 170. 
 256.  Hall, supra note 3, at 100. See also Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 131, at 1666 (noting that 
“case studies have found that the drafters of both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Indian Constitution deliberately avoided the term ‘due process of law’ for fear that it would provide overly 
broad discretion to the judiciary, opting instead for more specific language”); Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 
589 (John Hart Ely “says the dispute is between ‘interpretivism,’ which holds that ‘judges . . . should 
confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution,’ and 
‘noninterpretivism,’ which holds that ‘courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms 
that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document.’ Substantive due process is associated 
with noninterpretivism.”). 
 257.  O’Loughlin, supra note 171, at 1327. See also Hall, supra note 3, at 93 (“[S]ubstantive due 
process now protects individuals from governmental behavior that ‘shocks the conscience,’ in the criminal 
law context, and other infringements of rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”). 
2018] DUTY TO PROTECT FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 773 
will be justified in most situations.258 This should be true when the government 
takes steps to abate the adverse effects of climate change by obstructing those 
who are contributing to it or protecting citizens from its harmful effects. When 
the government’s action, however, interferes with an especially important public 
right, then its justification for its action must be particularly compelling.259 This 
situation could arise in the case of climate change when the government’s 
protective action invades a protected property right. There is certainly no 
freestanding protected public right to contribute to the adverse effects of climate 
change. 
The Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights. Justice Harlan 
maintained that the Due Process Clause “protects ‘basic values ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ regardless of whether such values are embodied in 
the Bill of Rights or its penumbras.”260 The fundamental nature of “a due process 
right is determined by deference to history, our basic societal values[,] and the 
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers”; as Justice Goldberg said, any 
“unenumerated constitutional rights must be so rooted in ‘the traditions and 
[collective] conscience of our people . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’”261 
The idea of tradition helps assure that to the extent that political decision makers 
depart from text, their opponents can be more confident that society will control 
them, if they cannot control themselves.262 
Moreover, “certain explicit rights necessarily required implicit rights in 
order to protect the explicit.”263 Rights found in the concept of ordered liberty 
include those that are explicitly set forth in the Bill of Rights, and those that are 
implicit in the right to ordered liberty.264 An example of the expansiveness of 
 
 258.  O’Loughlin, supra note 171, at 1327. 
 259.  Id. (“Actions that infringe particularly important rights require a more compelling public 
interest.”). 
 260.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 460 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 261.  Id. at 463. But see Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 949 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I realize that it is far easier to substitute individual judges’ ideas of 
“fairness” for the fairness prescribed by the Constitution, but I shall not at any time surrender my belief 
that that document itself should be our guide, not our own concept of what is fair, decent, and right.”)). 
 262.  See also Strauss, supra note 151, at 924 (“once a society develops political traditions, political 
actors can be more confident that their opponents, even if arguably departing from the text, will operate 
within the traditions, or will be reined in by other forces in society if they do not do so”). 
 263.  Hall, supra note 3, at 95–96 (referencing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
 264.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) 
(acknowledging both express and implicit rights expressed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973)); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 703, 720–21 (1997) (citing Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 502 (1977) (detailing the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive due process analysis); Marshall v. 
Rodgers, 566 U.S. 284, 288 (2012) (stating requirements that rights be succinctly presented with a careful 
description to be protected by substantive due process); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)) (explaining how rights must be 
deeply rooted within U.S. history as to be considered fundamental); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2598 (2015) (discussing how tradition and history are guidelines, not limitations); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 871 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that a due process right within 
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substantive due process is its incorporation of the implicit right to marriage 
“because of its fundamental nature and traditional esteem.”265 This substantive 
due process analysis required a finding that the claimed right or interest is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”266 in other words, that the 
“protected interests derive from preexisting notions of the law.”267 
An argument can be made that the public’s right to a clean and sustainable 
environment is deeply rooted in the country’s history and tradition.268 According 
to Ledewitz, since Frederick Jackson Turner announced the closing of the 
American frontier in 1893, as a country we have had some understanding that 
there were environmental limits.269Additionally, “the enormous body of 
environmental regulation, state constitutional environmental provisions[,] and 
common law restrictions reinforce a right to environmental protection.”270 This 
history and body of law mean that no one in the country today “would think there 
is a right to pollute the air or land of his or her neighbor.”271 Additionally, given 
the Framers’ concern about protecting a sustainable environment and the fact 
that they “put a premium on environmental amenities,”272 one could consider 
 
our understanding of liberty must be universal). These cases are cited in Hall, supra note 3, at 93, nn.72–
76. 
 265.  Hall, supra note 3, at 96 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598). See also J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 
77, at 486 (“This Note has postulated that a constitutional right of environment can be recognized because 
it is ‘fundamental’ and that it can be effectively asserted against government officials because it is 
‘preferred.’”). 
 266.  Hall, supra note 3, at 93 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703 (“[T]he Court has regularly 
observed that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”)) To be within the concept of “ordered liberty,” the 
claimed right must be “deeply rooted” such that it is considered “fundamental,” and also be capable of a 
“careful description.” Id. Hall notes, however, that tradition and history are only “guidelines,” and are 
“not limitations” on the concept’s expansiveness, but the concept must be “universal—applicable to all 
people at all times.” Id. See also Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (saying that the Constitution protects an interest 
because that interest is rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (saying that claims of entitlement come from existing understandings of 
law, not the Constitution). These cases are cited in O’Loughlin, supra note 171, at 1340 n.160 (2017); id. 
at 1340 (“. . . when identifying fundamental liberty interests that merit protection, courts look to tradition 
and the nation’s history to identify those interests that Americans recognize as vital to their pursuit of 
happiness”) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)); Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 936 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has found that the guarantees against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and 
uncompensated takings are sufficiently ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ to be incorporated 
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 267.  O’Loughlin, supra note 171, at 1329 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). See also Krotoszynski, 
supra note 113, at 933 (“Beginning with Twining v. New Jersey and Palko v. Connecticut and continuing 
through Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has used tradition to determine whether particular 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights apply to the states.”). 
 268.  Indeed, this is exactly the argument that U.S. District Court Judge Ann Aiken made in Juliana 
v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) (“Exercising my ‘reasoned judgment,’ I have 
no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and 
ordered society.”). 
 269.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 646. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Hall, supra note 3, at 109. 
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environmental protection a foundational idea. And, to the extent the courts look 
to state acceptance as a means of determining that a right is part of the country’s 
tradition,273 the fact that most of the states have incorporated environmental 
protection into their constitutions argues in favor of considering an 
environmental protection norm traditional and thus incorporated into the 
fundamental rights that the Due Process Clause protects.274 
Historical acceptance of some beliefs or institutions serves to validate 
them.275 “[T]he longer a constitutional regime endures, the more it develops 
constitutional traditions, and the more stable the patterns of cooperation become 
in society.”276 When that happens, “the text becomes less important, and the 
distinction between written and unwritten constitutions blurs.”277 However, 
while a “substantive due process doctrine limited to protecting the traditions 
maintained since time immemorial will not cause much ruckus,” if it acts to 
foreclose “any possibility of establishing new or modified traditions, . . . it fences 
out all claims that a new tradition has emerged” and “that a new national 
consensus exists regarding a particular claim of right.”278 Thus, the argument 
would be that the Due Process Clause should not be used to block any new 
consensus about the importance of environmental protection and the emergence 
of a new environmental right. 
However, relying on previous Court precedent offers a weak rationale for 
considering an environmental protection norm a matter of tradition because the 
precedent on climate change has been uneven.279 Nor can foreign law help 
 
 273.  Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 937. 
 274.  Krotoszynski argues that a lot of states accepting an initiative over a relatively short time frame 
presents a stronger argument in favor of that initiative reflecting “tradition” than what the law was like at 
the Founding. Id. at 1000. See also id. at 1015 (“Justice Kennedy’s focus [in Lawrence] on the direction 
of legal change over the last fifty years, rather than the preceding 250 years, also seemed justified if the 
tradition test is to honor not only old traditions, but also new ones. A tradition test that does not look 
beyond Lord Coke will largely eliminate substantive due process review for contemporary legal claims.”). 
 275.  Id. at 976 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 40 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Historical acceptance of legal institutions serves to 
validate them not because history provides the most convenient rule of decision but because we have 
confidence that a long-accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon procedures 
found to be either irrational or unfair.”)). But Krotoszynski warns that “[i]f the tradition inquiry is to serve 
as more than a mere Dumbo’s feather, it must constrain discretion in a meaningful and predictable way.” 
Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 942. 
 276.  Strauss, supra note 151, at 924. 
 277.  Id. But see id. at 923 (“The point is not that the Framers, or ‘we the people,’ commanded the 
reforms that the Court undertook. The Court undertook those reforms, and the reforms lasted, because 
they made moral and practical sense, and because, by virtue of their connection to the text, society could 
reach agreement (or at least narrow the range of disagreement) on a legal outcome even in the face of deep 
moral disagreement.”). 
 278.  Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 998. 
 279.  See Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (holding the Clean Air Act 
displaced federal common law claim seeking injunctive relief for greenhouse gas emissions); Native Vill. 
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th. Cir. 2012) (holding federal common law 
displaced when plaintiffs seeking damages). But see Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233–
34, (D. Or. 2016) (allowing lawsuit to proceed alleging government’s fossil fuel policies violated their 
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support the argument that an environmental norm is traditional,280 given the 
Court’s current hostility toward using foreign law as a test for anything.281 
Therefore, even though most countries have included an environmental norm in 
their constitutions,282 making the norm “traditional” in those countries, that 
rationale will be unhelpful here.283 
Ledewitz contends that substantive due process found in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments together with the Equal Protection Clause, “are the 
doctrinal underpinnings to the right to a healthy environment.”284 He argues that 
the Due Process Clause “protects rights not protected by any other specific 
provision of the Constitution.”285 “[It] guarantees more than fair process, and the 
‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”286 
Conceptually, 
the right to a salubrious environment satisfies both tests of constitutionality. 
If the environment is destroyed, human life will perish. Under the 
‘penumbra’ theory, one’s Bill of Rights guarantees are more ‘meaningful’ if 
he is alive to enjoy them; under the substantive due process approach, the 
preservation of the species is probably the most fundamental value of our, or 
any, society.287 
Using the analytical method from Washington v. Glucksberg,288 which 
looks to history, legal traditions, and practices, “we would have additional 
 
fundamental constitutional rights as well as the government’s public trust duties toward them). See 
generally Michael C. Blumm & Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, 
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) (noting that unlike most recent 
environmental lawsuits, which rely largely on statutes and regulations, Juliana is instead a human rights 
case). 
 280.  Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 941. 
 281.  See Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 941 (referring to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002), “Justice Scalia insisted that ‘[w]here there is not first a settled 
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this 
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution’”); see also 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“While ‘[t]he practices of 
other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform 
among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,’ 
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among 
our people.”) (citation omitted). 
 282.  See supra pp. 130–32 (discussing how other countries have constitutionalized an environmental 
protection norm). 
 283.  See supra note 281. 
 284.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 588. See also Klipsch, supra note 67, at 223–24 (“Assuming that 
there is the requisite government action involved in air pollution activities, the due process clauses may 
provide limitations on those activities if ‘life’ includes ‘health’ and ‘deprive’ includes ‘threaten.’”); Kalen, 
supra note 37, at 169 (“The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, in particular, at their lowest 
denominator protect citizens against unnecessarily arbitrary and overly unreasonable behavior. These 
clauses also arguably secure citizens some measure of security for redressing personal harms.”). 
 285.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 635. 
 286.  Id. at 638 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)). 
 287.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 463. 
 288.  See Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 648–49. 
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justification for recognizing rights, particularly environmental and constitutional 
rights, in future generations.”289 Yet, intuitively, the fundamental nature of 
marriage or abortion is easier to see and demonstrate than environmental 
protection, which can be both subjective and subject to change.290 
Yet, there are a host of problems with using the Due Process Clause as a 
basis for constitutionalizing environmental protection. One is that substantive 
due process is not universally considered a “persuasive form” of constitutional 
interpretation; another is that its dependence on judicial interpretations usurps 
“democratic prerogatives,” (thus) inciting opposition to its use.291 According to 
Justice Harlan, “it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political 
doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare 
all others to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice 
by reasonably minded people acting through the political process.”292 
Another problem with relying on the Due Process Clause as a basis for an 
environmental protection right or duty is that a large swath of environmental 
cases that pose no threat to human health would be excluded.293 To rise to the 
level of a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, there must be an 
actual deprivation of life or at least a substantial reduction in individual life 
expectancy.294 While the “injured individual [often] benefits to some extent from 
the polluting activity,” for example by paying less for the good or activity that 
injured them, this “should not stop the assertion of individual rights.”295 Klipsch 
thinks the fact that sometimes individuals who have been harmed by pollution 
benefit in some way from the pollution should not prevent their assertion of an 
individual environmental right, but the possibility of that situation arising 
“should be a factor to consider before creating absolutes within a social 
 
 289.  Id. at 662–63. 
 290.  See Hall, supra note 3, at 108. 
 291.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 616–17. See also Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 957 (quoting 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, when a 
‘political theory’ embodied in our Constitution becomes outdated, it seems to me that a majority of the 
nine members of this Court are not only without constitutional power but are far less qualified to choose 
a new constitutional political theory than the people of this country proceeding in the manner provided by 
Article V.”)). 
 292.  Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 958 (quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
According to Krotoszynski, “Justice Harlan’s strict insistence on a preexisting tradition going back to the 
time of the framing would unduly limit the Supreme Court’s updating function and, in all probability, 
force greater reliance on the amending process to maintain the vitality of the Constitution.” Id. 
 293.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 230 (“Environmental activities which pose no apparent threat to 
human health contain no clear principle which would either establish the existence of substantive 
environmental rights or which could be reasonably applied to decide specific cases. A right against 
unreasonable impairment of health would seem to be principled, if only because it is supported by the 
language of the due process clause.”). 
 294.  Id. at 225 n.118. Klipsch argues that mere suffering would not warrant raising what might 
otherwise be considered a nuisance to a constitutional “deprivation.” Id. He likens this analysis to taking 
property “by a severe and continuing nuisance.” Id. 
 295.  Id. at 227. 
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context.”296 And, even when public health is at issue, with no offsetting benefits, 
there is no clear answer as to what the scope and amount of protection should be 
as “the due process clause does not begin to answer the question ‘how much,’”297 
and the causal connection between injury and environmental harm can be beyond 
evidentiary proof.298 
Additionally, the Due Process Clause limits the exercise of governmental 
authority, not individual action,299 requiring some form of government 
responsibility toward the environment to qualify as government involvement.300 
The requirement that the claim or interest must be carefully described301 may 
also be problematic in the case of an environmental right or duty.302 And 
protection of one individual’s right to environmental protection might come at 
the expense of another individual’s constitutionally protected right to enjoy their 
property. As Justice Harlan wrote, 
[a]s a general proposition it seem[ed]. . . very dubious that the Constitution 
was intended to create certain rights of private individuals as against other 
private individuals. The Constitutional Convention was called to establish a 
nation, not to reform the common law. Even the Bill of Rights, designed to 
protect personal liberties, was directed at rights against governmental 
authority, not other individuals.303 
So, the Due Process Clause as an independent base for an environmental 
protection right or duty seems far from a sure thing. 
 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. at 230. 
 298.  J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 467. The author of the Note goes on to speculate that “[s]uch 
burdens might be eased, however, if environmental protection were recognized as a collective right of the 
public.” One approach to overcome this problem “would protect the public from unreasonable 
environmental degradation. The ‘unreasonable’ standard is necessary because the public interest in 
preserving environmental integrity is not only one of degree, but it also competes with the public interest 
in maintaining material progress.” Id. at 473. 
 299.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 211. See also id. (“The mere issuance of a license, however, is not 
sufficient government involvement for there to be “state action” under the fourteenth amendment, nor, 
presumably, under the fifth.”). 
 300.  Id. at 214 n.64 (theorizing that this might be possible under the public trust doctrine). See also 
Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 658 (“Substantive due process, if really linked to the text of the Due Process 
Clause, would contain a state action requirement.”). 
 301.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 635 (discussing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.)). See also Krotoszynski, supra note 113, at 1014 (“The most compelling factor 
Justice Kennedy invoked in his majority opinion in Lawrence was the shift in state laws from 1961 to 
2003.”). 
 302.  See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 279 (explaining why the correct environmental policy “is not 
clearcut,” and saying “[b]ut environmental policy, like economic policy, education policy, welfare policy, 
and most of social policy in general, is defined by hard choices and complicated, multidimensional 
problems”). 
 303.  United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966). 
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2.  The Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause prevents the government from acting out of 
“animus or indifference to the needs of a particular group of its citizens,”304 in 
other words, from engaging in any activity that is “grounded in or reflective of 
the view that some citizens have less value as persons than others.”305 An 
animating principle of “the rule of law” and the concept of equal protection found 
in the Constitution “is the principle that government and each of its parts remain 
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”306 
Future generations are a group of citizens whose needs are ignored by the 
federal government’s current indifference to climate change’s impacts. This 
policy void “accept[s] the likelihood of permanent, irreversible change to the 
environment that will greatly harm future generations.”307 It also impairs future 
citizens’ access to government.308 The current generation’s “indifference to the 
needs of the future,” reflected in weak to non-existent governmental policies, 
creates “an insurmountable barrier” to immediate significant change.309 Only if 
government action encourages current citizens to act in a way that assures the 
interests of future ones, can future citizens “metaphorically” be thought of as 
having any access to government.310 The Equal Protection Clause might provide 
a basis for the Court to rectify this imbalance by encompassing an environmental 
protection right or duty, and forcing current representation of future interests. 
Given climate change’s permanent alterations, the need for current 
representation of future interests is particularly important.311 The Equal 
Protection Clause violation cannot be remedied in the future.312 In this way, 
government inaction “is destroying the opportunity for future generations to 
enjoy the natural world as all previous humans have done.”313 Moreover, the 
current generation, perhaps because of lack of empathy or government 
incentives, has shown itself unwilling to make any “serious sacrifices for our 
 
 304.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 591. 
 305.  Id. at 644 (“This view of unconstitutional animus is closer to the situation we are in today, since 
the current generation is willing to place burdens on future citizens it would not be willing to accept for 
itself.”). 
 306.  Id. at 642 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 307.  Id. at 644. 
 308.  Id. See also J.Y.P., Jr., supra note 77, at 483 (“[T]here are two arguments for according special 
judicial treatment to environmental rights. First, a ‘minority’ interest indeed may be at stake. In this area, 
unlike any other, today’s degradation may profoundly ‘oppress’ future generations. Protecting this 
voiceless minority’s interests could justify judicial activism in environmental cases.”). 
 309.  Ledewitz, supra note 4, at 644. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. at 644–45. 
 312.  Id. at 645. See also id. at 591 (“In terms of environmental harm, today’s generation may be 
thought of as the majority using its political muscle to permanently disadvantage future generations. 
Future generations, as an entirely unrepresented group, stand in as clear need of constitutional protection 
as do other vulnerable minorities.”). 
 313.  Id. at 642. 
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descendants” despite indications of the “coming catastrophe,” making it unlikely 
that they will be able to enjoy the same amenities.314 
If a court can be persuaded that “future generations have a right to be heard 
in the governing process,” then the question is “whether there is today an 
unjustified, actual refusal to represent their interests” in that process.315 And, if 
the Equal Protection Clause is capacious enough to protect future generations 
because they constitute “a ‘discrete and insular minority’ needing special 
protection by the courts,” then courts owe them a “duty of impartiality.”316 In 
the context of climate change, this means that, in addition to the right to be 
represented in the governing process, the unrealized right of future generations 
to be shielded from the adverse effects of climate change warrants both 
recognition and protection now, and the government’s failure to do any of this 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
There is a second sense in which the Equal Protection Clause might house 
an environmental protection norm, and that is to the extent that environmental 
harms caused by climate change fall disproportionately on discrete segments of 
the population, such as low-income communities or communities composed of 
peoples of color or other minority individuals.317 
For a variety of social, economic, and political reasons, minorities and the 
poor make up the greatest percentage of Americans who suffer the effects of 
living in environmentally contaminated neighborhoods and of working in 
environmentally hazardous workplaces. Typically, minorities and the poor 
have been unable to sue and to recover for environmental damage. They are 
often unable to make state and federal agencies respond to their 
environmental problems.318  
With respect to climate change, it is often minorities who live in areas that 
are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, with limited access to health 
care services and less capacity to relocate or rebuild after a climate-induced 
disaster like flooding or wildfires.319 Members of these communities are more 
likely to live in homes without air conditioning and with poor insulation, making 
 
 314.  Id. at 665. See also id. (“But we have no personal incentives to act and many incentives not to 
act in the current environmental crisis.”). 
 315.  Id. at 667. 
 316.  Id. at 643. See also id. at 659. One problem that Ledewitz brushes off is that “there would be 
something ludicrous about recognizing the rights of generations unborn, but not recognizing any rights in 
an unborn being already in existence.” Id. at 660 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158 (“holding, inter 
alia, that fetus is not ‘person’ for purposes of due process. ‘All this, together with our observation . . . that 
throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than 
they are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not 
include the unborn.’”)). 
 317.  See generally Hope M. Babcock, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow—Is Global Climate Change 
Another White Man’s Trick to Get Indian Land? The Role of Treaties in Protecting Tribes as They Adapt 
to Climate Change, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 371, 378–85 (2017) (describing the impact of climate change 
on Indian tribes). 
 318.  Gallagher, supra note 78, at 152. 
 319.  U.S. E.P.A., CLIMATE CHANGE, HEALTH, AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1 (2016). 
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them vulnerable to temperature extremes.320 They are also more likely to have 
poor access to health care as well as emergency services.321 They may also have 
limited transportation options and no access to emergency warnings in their 
native language, such as might be needed during a climate-driven disaster.322 
Members of these communities may be more prone to diseases, such as diabetes 
and respiratory illnesses, requiring medical care, which in a disaster may become 
unavailable.323 Rising water temperatures increase the likelihood of waterborne 
illnesses from bacteria, parasites, and harmful algae, and intense storms can 
damage water treatment systems and stormwater infrastructure.324 Individuals of 
color or from low-income or immigrant communities are more likely than the 
average community to have health problems like diabetes, asthma, and chronic 
pulmonary diseases, conditions that can be aggravated by high heat, changes in 
the pollen season, and wildfires, such as might occur more frequently in a 
climate-changed environment.325 
To the extent that the Equal Protection Clause protects discrete groups of 
citizens, and both future generations and environmental justice communities 
qualify for protection under the Clause, then it might provide a home for an 
environmental protection norm and a corresponding right or affirmative duty. 
Finding an individual right or an affirmative governmental duty would enable 
these groups to use the Clause to protect themselves from the government’s 
apathetic and harmful climate control policies. 
3.  The Bill of Rights 
Like the Court’s “evolving” approach to substantive due process, from the 
second half of the twentieth century, the Court’s approach to the Bill of Rights 
has involved finding implicit rights embedded in explicit rights.326 For example, 
the Court has ruled that the 
First Amendment implicitly guarantees the public right to attend criminal 
trials in order to secure the rights of a free press. The Fifth Amendment’s 
witness clause also implicitly requires a warning to the accused of the right 
to remain silent to act as a safe guard against self-incrimination. The 
exclusionary rule was created by implication to secure the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel covertly 
secures the indigent with an attorney with minimal level of competence.327  
 
 320.  Id. at 2. 
 321.  Id. 
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 323.  Id. at 4. 
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 325.  Id. at 2–4. 
 326.  Hall, supra note 3, at 97. 
 327.  Id. at 97. 
782 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:735 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,328 the Court read into the Second 
Amendment, which Hall described as the “implicit personal right to own a pistol 
in order to secure a ‘right to bear arms,’” and Justice Kennedy, in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,329 found in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause the right to express one’s religious beliefs.330 
If rights like the right to own a gun and the right to express religious beliefs 
may be implicitly recognized in the Bill of Rights, then Hall reasons “there must 
be a right to some basic environmental quality so as to sustain life so that all 
other constitutional rights may be protected and exercised.”331 As Rachel Carson 
explains, “[i]f the Bill of Rights contains no guarantees that a citizen shall be 
secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private individuals or public 
officials, it is surely only because our forefathers, despite their considerable 
wisdom and foresight, could conceive of no such problems.”332 
Environmental scholars, like Carole Gallagher, argue that “preservation of 
the environment is essential to one’s individual rights of self-realization, of one’s 
right to learn and to discover truth[,] and of one’s right to participate fully in our 
democracy” and “[that] these rights are all necessarily implied by the language 
of the First Amendment.”333 However, the Court quashed that idea in Lyng v. 
Northwestern Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,334 when it said that “it would 
not recognize environmental rights to be inherent in the First Amendment at any 
time in the near future.”335 
An alternative approach that emanates from the Bill of Rights as a whole is 
that there are penumbral rights, which radiate out from the Bill of Rights, whose 
“existence is necessary in making the express [Bill of Rights] guarantees fully 
meaningful.”336 The Court in Poe v. Ullman, after endorsing an expansive view 
of the Due Process Clause, wrote that the due process cases on which it relied  
“suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”337 
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 330.  Hall, supra note 3, at 97–98. 
 331.  Hall, supra note 3, at 99. See also id. at 98 (“[T]he understanding of substantive due process 
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2018] DUTY TO PROTECT FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 783 
Justice Douglas, who was an advocate of this theory, argued that “the 
Constitution protects these ‘penumbral’ rights just as it protects the 
‘fundamental’ specific guarantees which the general rights preserve.”338 He 
reasoned that the specific rights in the Bill of Rights “are not complete in 
themselves, but that they also evidence more general, ‘peripheral’ rights without 
which ‘the specific rights would be less secure.’”339 In Griswold v. 
Connecticut,340 the Court found Connecticut’s law on contraception an 
unconstitutional infringement on a ‘penumbral’ right of privacy emanating from 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 
as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.341 
Thus far, “no federal court has explicitly recognized a fundamental 
environmental right, whether emanating from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights 
or otherwise.”342 Although finding a fundamental environmental right in the 
penumbra is less contentious than finding a right for it in the Due Process Clause, 
a leap must still be made to also include more privileged communities within this 
penumbral right. 
4.  The Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment provides that the Constitution’s list of enumerated 
rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”343 Scholars variously view the Ninth Amendment as “a source of 
natural justice rights[,] a rule of construction for securing unenumerated rights 
(but not a source of rights)[,] a grant of standing to argue public rights[,] a source 
of public rights[,] and solely a protector of individual, personal rights.”344 The 
Supreme Court is less clear about what it is.345 
There are two basic arguments for using the Ninth Amendment as a source 
of a new substantive right or duty like the one argued for here: the Amendment 
is (1) its own source of these rights, or (2) a rule of construction that allows a 
search of the Constitution as a whole for new rights.346 Reflecting a slightly 
different version of the second argument, Justice Goldberg, together with Justice 
 
Bill of Rights, it also grounds judicial recognition of rights that have no written analogue in the Bill of 
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 342.  Id. 111–12. 
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 344.  Klipsch, supra note 67, at 219–20. 
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Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, in a concurring opinion in Griswold,347 
articulated the belief that the Ninth Amendment is not an “independent source of 
rights,” rather that the Amendment’s “language and history imply the existence 
of unenumerated fundamental rights which are contained in the traditions and 
collective conscience of our people.”348 Like the three concurring Justices in 
Griswold, Grey maintains that “[t]he [N]inth [A]mendment on its face has no 
substantive content! It is rather a license to constitutional decisionmakers to look 
beyond the substantive commands of the constitutional text to protect 
fundamental rights not expressed therein.”349 According to Grey, the Ninth 
Amendment reflects the Amendment’s framers’ belief that “unwritten higher law 
principles had constitutional status,” a belief that was implicitly and explicitly 
reflected in constitutional text from the country’s beginning and is reflected in 
the “‘majestic generalities’ of section I” of the Amendment.350 
Therefore, as with the Due Process Clause, the question that must be 
answered with respect to the use of the Ninth Amendment in this context is 
whether the rights or duty claimed in this Article have sufficient historical or 
fundamental status to warrant being considered an unwritten “higher law 
principle”—in the case of the Ninth Amendment, on the order of a natural right—
to be protected by either of those constitutional provisions. To the extent that this 
natural right analysis under the Ninth Amendment approximates the “tradition” 
analysis under the Due Process Clause, the answer to the question might be in 
the affirmative. But, the Ninth Amendment suffers from the same uncertainties 
and controversy that attend the Due Process Clause and thus alone seems a 
“slender reed”351 to support such a right or duty. 
This Part of the Article has identified several places in the Constitution 
where an environmental protection norm in the form of an individual right or a 
governmental duty might find a home, but has also shown that none is a perfect 
fit. Thus, the best approach may be the one that Klipsch disdained—looking for 
support in the Constitution as a whole, an approach the Court followed when it 
constitutionalized new rights in the recent past, like the right to life or the right 
to privacy. In those situations, new, broadly accepted unenumerated rights, 
which were either so basic or necessary for the realization of enumerated rights, 
found support in the entire constitutional text. 
An environmental protection norm is both basic and necessary because it is 
a prerequisite for the fulfillment of many of the enumerated rights. For example, 
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the right to life and liberty would be meaningless if there was no clean air to 
breathe or clean water to drink. Indeed, protection of the environment and natural 
resources is critical to our Union’s survival, implicating the entire Constitution 
for its support. And states that have either incorporated or found such a norm in 
their existing constitutional text, as well as other nations who have taken the 
same approach, signal broad-based social acceptance of the norm as a 
constitutional right. 
However, the blunt fact is that there is simply no “clear legal and historical 
precedent for basic constitutional environmental rights.”352 Courts are afraid of 
“being drawn into political, scientific, social[,] and economic battles of the 
moment,” such as envelop modern environmental policy, and believe themselves 
scientifically and technically “inadequate” to define the bounds of a healthy or 
clean environment.353 They would much prefer delegating that task to the 
legislative or executive branch of government.354 
CONCLUSION 
Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity 
of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth 
is distant[.] 
—Judge Learned Hand355 
 
The questions this Article has tried to answer are whether the time has come 
to incorporate an environmental protection norm into the Constitution in the form 
of an individual right or an affirmative governmental duty, and, if it has, how 
that can be done. Prior to addressing these questions, the Article discussed a 
predicate one, whether the norm should be in the form of a right enjoyed by 
individuals or an obligation imposed on the government. The Article is largely 
agnostic on the resolution of that issue, although tilting slightly towards framing 
the norm as a duty because it may present fewer implementation problems than 
if it were couched as a right. 
As for the first question, the Article concludes that the time is emphatically 
now for constitutionalizing an environmental norm. Given the government’s 
abdication of responsibility, constitutionalizing such a norm is the only way that 
individuals, particularly the country’s most vulnerable ones and those unborn, 
and the environment are going to be protected from the growing threat of climate 
change. The Article shows how interpreting the Constitution to include an 
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environmental protection norm is consistent with an interpretive history of the 
Constitution, which has allowed constitutional text to be expanded to incorporate 
other basic, socially accepted norms in the form of rights or duties. The Article 
also identifies specific places in the Constitution where an environmental 
protection norm might find an interpretive home, but here it ran into trouble. 
While finding a specific constitutional provision sufficiently capacious to 
house an environmental protection norm would be more consistent with the 
traditional approach to constitutional interpretation, the problem is that each 
identified place has problems and thus offers too slender a reed to support such 
a bold claim. Yet, there may be support in the Constitution as a whole, an 
approach followed with respect to other relatively new rights, like the right to 
privacy, because the unenumerated right in question was basic and had been 
accepted by society. The Article argues that the norm’s basic nature, which 
makes it a predicate to the public enjoying many of its rights under the 
Constitution, and the growing public consensus about the unanswered threat 
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